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Essays on the Economics of Higher Education and Employment
Seung Eun Park
This dissertation studies legal and institutional policies that help to reduce the barriers to
educational attainment and employment. The first chapter examines the effect of availability
of juvenile record laws on education attainment and employment using state statue revisions
after the passage of the federal Second Chance Act. The second chapter examines enrollment
patterns of students who drop out from community colleges and identify four typologies of
college dropouts and important factors that contribute to college success. The third chapter
estimates the impact of federal Pell Grant eligibility on financial aid packages, labor supply
while in schools, and academic outcomes for community college students. The three chapters
together shed light on how federal, state, and institutional policies can help reduce the
academic and employment barriers for the marginalized population in the United States.
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The United States continues to face achievement and employment gaps by race. In 2015-
2016, the adjusted cohort graduation rate among white, public high school students was 88%
while black, public high school students graduated at a rate of 76% (Digest of Education
Statistics, 2017, table 219.46). At the college level, white students achieved six-year com-
pletion rates that were 1.5 times higher than those observed for black students (62 percent
versus 37 percent) (Shapiro, et al., 2017). Similarly, despite historically low national un-
employment levels (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018, Report 1076), the unemployment rate
for blacks is about two times higher than the unemployment rate for whites (7.5 versus 3.8
percent). In my dissertation, I focus on three marginalized populations who are predomi-
nantly comprised of racial minorities, ex-juvenile offenders, community college dropouts, and
low-income students. I examine legal and institutional policies that can help reduce the bar-
riers for these populations. In particular, I provide empirical evidence that (1) information
sharing with the justice system and schools can help improve educational attainment in the
aggregate, (2) separating out by dropout typologies can help better identify specific factors
that contribute to completion, and (3) a modest Pell grant can help reduce the need to work
while enrolled in college and thereby increase enrollment intensity.
Chapter one examines the effect of availability of juvenile records on high school gradu-
ation, the probability of ever attending college, and employment. In this chapter I evaluate
state revisions to juvenile record laws (39 states) after the passage of the federal Second
Chance Act (Y2008-2015) (39 states), which were intended to help re-entry of ex-juvenile
offenders. After categorizing the laws into four types - information sharing with schools,
xii
information sharing across interagency, limiting information sharing with the public, and
expanding sealing and expungement eligibility - I utilize a difference-in-difference strategy
to estimate the effects of each four types on educational outcomes and employment. I find
significant and positive impacts of school notification laws on both educational outcomes. In
addition, I find suggestive positive effects of expanding sealing and expungement eligibility
on employment. By contrast, I find no robust impact from reforms that shared information
across interagency and limited public access to juvenile records. This study contributes to
the economic debate on information sharing and confidentiality in the justice system.
In chapter two, I use cluster analysis to identify four typologies of community college
dropouts using enrollment patterns: college trials (dropouts after one semester of trials),
high credit attempting medium dropouts, low credit attempting medium dropouts, and late
dropouts. Matching students who complete to students who dropout with similar enrollment
patterns, I identify different sets of variables that are important to predicting completion.
Specifically, using gradient boosting algorithm, I find third-year enrollment variables (i.e.,
credits withdrawn, full-time status, and remedial credits attempted) largely contribute to
predictions of completion among late dropouts. On the contrary, math and science credits
earned in the first and second year are most predictive of completion among high credit
attempted medium dropouts.
Chapter three, co-authored paper with Judith Scott-Clayton, examines the effects of
receiving modest Pell Grant ($500) aid on financial aid packages, labor supply while in school,
and academic outcomes for community college students. The federal Pell grant program is
the nation’s largest source of grant aid for students from lower income families. We compare
community college students just above and below the expected family contribution (EFC)
cutoff for receiving a Pell Grant and find that other financial aid adjusts in ways that
vary by institution: students at schools that offer federal loans borrowed more if they just
missed the Pell eligibility threshold, but at other schools, students who just missed the
cutoff for Pell were compensated with higher state grants. Focusing on the loan-offering
xiii
schools where students face a discontinuity in total grant aid, we find suggestive evidence
that receiving a modest Pell Grant instead of additional loans leads students to reduce labor
supply and increase enrollment intensity. We also provide indirect evidence that students’
initial enrollment choices are influenced by an offer of Pell Grants versus loans.
To summarize, together these three chapters provide empirical evidence for legal and
institutional policies that can help reduce barriers in educational attainment and employment
for marginalized populations. The findings of my dissertation recommend that (i) states
and institutions collaboratively build an information sharing system between the justice
and school systems to better aid students for successful re-entry, (ii) institutions create
standard practices in identifying at-risk dropout types and employ specific interventions for
completion, and (iii) institutions promote need-based grant aid over additional loans.
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Chapter 1
The Effects of Revisions to Juvenile
Record Laws on Education Outcomes
and Employment after the Second
Chance Act of 2007
Rina Seung Eun Park
1
I Introduction
On April 9, 2008, the Second Chance Act of 2007 (H.R. 1593) was signed into law under
the title “to reauthorize the grant program for reentry of offenders into the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, to improve reentry planning and implementation, and
for other purposes.” The Second Chance Act authorized up to $165 million in federal grants to
state and local government agencies under the stated goal of reducing recidivism, increasing
public safety, and promoting successful re-integration (The Council of State Government
Justice Center, 2018). Since then, the majority of states have made significant changes to
their criminal laws, including those related to juvenile justice.
During the years between 2008 and 2015, 39 states made revisions to their juvenile records
legislation.1 These revisions include strengthening protections of juvenile records from the
public, expanding eligibility and modifying procedures needed for sealing and expungement,
expanding interagency2 information sharing, and expanding information sharing to schools.3
Protecting juvenile records from being accessed by the general public is one way to mitigate
unnecessary collateral damage a juvenile might face after being released and transitioning to
adulthood. Similarly, sealing and expungement procedures offer another layer of protection
by sealing or erasing one’s youthful criminal history from the public (Shah, Fine, & Gullen,
2014). On the other hand, information sharing between agencies that serve and arrest
juvenile offenders has been promoted as means to identify at-risk students, provide early
1 Author’s calculation using the National Conference of State Legislature’s Juvenile Jus-
tice Bills Tracking Database, available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/
ncsls-juvenile-justice-bill-tracking-database.aspx. The sample included 51 states, including the District of
Columbia.
2 Interagency refers to any individual or institution that can provide information in the juvenile justice
process. For example, interagency information sharing includes interactions between social workers and
probation officers, law enforcement and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and Juvenile
and Domestic Relations District Court Records and the Department of Motor Vehicles.
3 During the time period of this study, six states (Arizona, Florida, Louisiana, Minnesota, New Hampshire,
and Virginia) allowed law enforcement to collect personal information such as photographs and fingerprints.
The majority of these laws were enacted in 2008. As there is no obvious mechanism between these laws and
education and employment outcomes, this paper does not include these laws in the analysis.
2
supervision and treatment, avoid juvenile court involvement, and make informed decisions
with more information (Griffin, 2000; Teske, 2011; Wachter, 2017).
A large body of research demonstrates that having a juvenile record and sharing that
information can have negative consequences on high school graduation, college enrollment,
and employment. For an example, conviction (incarceration) while in high school can double
(quadruple) the odds of dropping out from high school (Aizer & Doyle Jr, 2015; Hjalmarsson,
2008; Sweeten, 2006). College and financial aid applications that ask about the applicant’s
criminal history can limit college access for those with a criminal record (Lovenheim &
Owens, 2014; Pierce, Runyan, & Bangdiwala, 2014; Stewart & Uggen, 2018). And a handful
of research finds that juvenile offenders have high unemployment rates, short job tenures,
and low wages after confinement and incarceration (Beckett & Western, 2001; Gottfredson
& Barton, 1993; Nagin & Waldfogel, 1995; Tanner, Davies, & O’Grady, 1999).
Prior research indicates that both labeling effects and behavioral effects are the under-
lying mechanisms behind these negative consequences. High school students with juvenile
records are often stigmatized and re-classified as special education students, segregated into
specialized programs, or referred to alternative schools under exclusionary polices (Aizer &
Doyle Jr, 2015; Kirk & Sampson, 2013). At the college level, one study found that applica-
tions with felony convictions had a 12 percentage point higher rejection rate than matched
pair applications without felony convictions at four-year colleges (Stewart & Uggen, 2018).
Another study found that when the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA)
introduced a question about drug convictions in 2001, immediate college enrollments with
drug convictions fell by 12 to 22 percentage points for high school graduates (Lovenheim
& Owens, 2014). However, another strand of research finds stronger evidence for behav-
ioral effects being a major barrier to progress in schooling and employment. For example,
one study found that students with a felony conviction were more likely (62 percent) to
leave college applications unfinished when asked about their criminal history compared with
those without a conviction (21 percent) (Rosenthal, NaPier, Warth, & Weissman, 2015).
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Another study finds that among first-time convicted young adults, incarceration reduced
employment mainly through labor non-participation rather than through unemployment (5–
12 percentage points of a total 9–15 percentage point decrease in employment was due to
labor non-participation) (Apel & Sweeten, 2010).
In contrast, we know much less about how information sharing can affect education and
employment outcomes in the context of juvenile offenses. Economic theory of information
sharing indicates that information sharing from the justice system to schools can benefit by
allowing schools to make better informed decisions and more efficiently allocate resources
(e.g., school counselors, parent/guardian, parole/probation officer, and/or assigned school
mentors) to those who need it the most (Bennett, 2010). There has long been a positive
view of information sharing, when the federal government included building infrastructure
for information sharing as one program of the Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grant
(JAIGB) Act in 1997, a $250 million federal block grant to local governments. Information
sharing started to receive more attention when the Second Chance Act included improving
information sharing capabilities as one of its goals. In addition, at the K-12 level, multi-
agency information sharing is viewed as an alternative strategy to a zero tolerance policy
to promote campus safety, as zero tolerance policies increase referral and suspension rates
(Marsh, 2014). Under the premise that information sharing will allow schools to improve
their capacity to identify at-risk students at a early period, schools can provide early support
and prevent at-risk students from engaging in serious criminal activities. As the literature
has increasingly reflected evidence of the negative consequences of a zero tolerance policy,
Teske recommended using a multi-disciplinary integrated system as an alternative to zero
tolerance policy and demonstrated a 67.4% reduction in school referrals, a 20% increase in
graduation rates, and a 51% reduction in felony rates (Teske, 2011; Teske, Huff, & Graves,
2013).
There is far less, if any, empirical research that provides causal estimates of information
sharing in the juvenile justice context. A few early studies questioned the existence of
4
negative labeling effect among juveniles after being arrested. For an example, one study
found that boys did not experience any change in their relationship with family or teachers
after being in contact with law enforcement agencies. Two recent studies report that arrest
is so common that students find little to no stigmatizing effects from family, teachers, or
friends (Adams, Robertson, Gray-Ray, & Ray, 2003; Hirschfield, 2008). Alternatively, a
handful of re-entry literature finds some evidence of better allocating in-need support (e.g.,
health services) to juveniles whose information is shared between the justice system and
health services (Bai, Wells, & Hillemeier,2009; Chuang & Wells, 2010). There are a few
descriptive studies that identified a lack of collaboration, communication, and data sharing
capabilities between schools and juvenile justice agencies as a major barrier to successful re-
entry into schools (Feierman, Levick, & Mody, 2009; Leone & Weinberg, 2010; Richardson,
DiPaola, & Gable, 2012; Seigle, Walsh, & Weber, 2014; Wojcik, Schmetterer, & Naar, 2008).
It is less obvious how policies can play an adequate role to reduce the barriers and pro-
mote reintegration for ex-offenders, in the aggregate. Past efforts have focused primarily on
restricting access to criminal information; however, simply restricting access has had unin-
tended social consequences. Litwok (2014)’s dissertation compared states that allowed auto-
matic expungement with states that accept petitions for expungement and found that those
who had been through the juvenile justice system and were living in states with automatic
expungement had higher college attendance and graduation rates as well as higher aver-
age earnings. However, “ban-the-box” policies, which prevent job applications from asking
about prior criminal involvement, caused an unintended increase in statistical discrimination
against young, low-skilled black man by 3.4 percentage points (Doleac & Hansen, 2017).
In this paper, I implement a difference-in-differences design that examines the impact of
the availability of juvenile records on educational attainment and employment through revi-
sions in record laws since the Second Chance Act (2007). The period of this study is between
2008 and 2015; during this period, the public shifted away from a tough-on-crime position
and focused on rehabilitating youth who were in contact with the justice system. This is
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referred to as the “Fourth Wave reform to juvenile justice.” I focus on revisions to records
legislation and code them into four categories: laws that (1) expand information shared with
youth-serving systems (e.g., schools), (2) expand interagency information sharing, (3) limit
public access, and (4) expand sealing and expungement eligibility.
As a preview of the results, using October Current Population Survey (CPS) data among
ages 18 to 24, I find that states that expanded information sharing to schools has an av-
erage increase of 1.1 to 2.5 percentage points in their high school graduation rates and an
increase of 2.0 to 3.5 percent points on the likelihood of ever attending college. In addition,
I find suggestive evidence that states that expanded eligibility for sealing and expungement
experienced an increase employment; however, this finding is not significant across specifica-
tions. Similarly, I find suggestive evidence for the negative effects of interagency information
sharing (excluding schools) on ever attending college; however, this is not significant across
specifications. In contrast, I find no robust impact on educational attainment and employ-
ment from states that enacted laws limiting public access to juvenile records.
This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, this paper is unique that it
explores policy changes regarding the availability of juvenile records and how such changes
affect education and employment outcomes in the aggregate.4 Furthermore, this paper brings
in new aspect on the benefits of some information sharing, an area that is very understudied.
By examining both information sharing and protecting aspects of record policy, the findings
of this study can provide clear guidance to practitioners and policy makers in identifying
4 Much prior work has focused on identifying the negative consequences and underlying mechanisms
between involvement in the justice system and educational attainment or employment rates. For example,
a handful of studies convincingly demonstrated the negative consequences of having a criminal record on
one’s education and employment prospects. Arrest while in high school, adjudication, and confinement
can increase the odds of dropping out of high school (Aizer & Doyle Jr, 2015; Hjalmarsson, 2008; Kirk &
Sampson, 2013; Sweeten, 2006). Having a felony conviction increases one’s probability of receiving a rejection
from a college application by 12–13 percentage points (Stewart & Uggen, 2018), and 62% of individuals with
prior felony conviction failed to complete the application process (Rosenthal et al., 2015). Introducing a
question about drug convictions on the FAFSA in 2001 decreased college enrollment by 12–22 percentage
points for high school graduates with drug convictions (Lovenheim & Owens, 2014). Other claims regarding
collateral consequences included limited housing opportunities, driving privileges, and social welfare (Shah
& Strout, 2016).
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areas where information sharing or protecting can be beneficial or harmful.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides background on juvenile
records legislation. Section 3 describes data and sample for the analysis and section 4
describes the difference-in-differences strategy. Section 6 presents the basic difference-in-
differences results and section 7 presents the heterogeneous treatment effects. Section 8
provides sensitivity checks. Lastly, section 9 discusses policy implications and remaining
questions.
II Juvenile Record Laws
A Background
In 2016, more than 850,000 people under age of 18 were arrested (8% of total arrests).
Among juvenile arrests, 7% were arrested for offenses on the violent crime index, 21% for
property crime, and 11.5% for drug abuse. The demographic characteristics for juvenile
arrests (under age of 18) are predominately male (71%), late teens (78% are older than the
age of 15), and white (62%) (Puzzanchera & Kang, 2017). Although national crime statistics
for any given year are available, what is less clear is the population size of a cumulative arrest,
which is the population affected by changes in records legislation. One recent study using
the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1997 estimates about 15.9–26.8% of youth have
ever been arrested by age 18 and 25.3–41.4% by age 23 (Brame, Turner, Paternoster, &
Bushway, 2012). A follow-up study finds that males are two times more likely than females
and blacks are slightly more likely (30%) than whites (22%) to have ever been arrested by
age 18 (Brame, Bushway, Paternoster, & Turner, 2014).
The US juvenile justice system was initially established to distinguish youth from adults
and to focus on rehabilitation and child welfare (Sickmund & Puzzanchera, 2014). Conse-
quently, the juvenile justice system was very different from the criminal justice system in
handling cases and court hearings informally and keeping records confidential unless, for
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the purpose to help rehabilitation (Juvenile Law Center, 2014). However, during the 1980s
and 1990s when serious juvenile crime rate reached a peak in 1994 (see Figure 1.1), public
sentiment began to favor a stricter justice system. This led to significant changes in state
legislation on juvenile crime. These changes include transferring provisions from the juvenile
to the criminal justice system, expanding sentencing options, and modifying the confiden-
tiality of juvenile records and proceedings. Between 1992 and 1997, 45 states made changes
in transfer provisions, 31 states in sentencing authority, and 47 states in confidentiality laws
(Sickmund & Puzzanchera, 2014). Related to record laws, the changes allowed more excep-
tions to record confidentiality (sealing, expungement, or deletion), expansion in the ability
to collect personal information such as DNA or fingerprints, and more information sharing
between justice agencies and youth-serving systems (Sickmund & Puzzanchera, 2014; Tor-
bet, Gable, Montgomery, & Hurst, 1996; Willison, Mears, Shollenberger, Owens, & Butts,
2010). Ever since, the confidentiality level of juvenile records has varied across states. For
an example, in 2009, 31 states had exceptions for sealing or expungement in subsequent
offenses, 41 states had no age restrictions for taking fingerprints of an offender, and 46 states
had school notification laws (Sickmund & Puzzanchera, 2014).
In contrast to the 1990s, the past fifteen years have been the lowest era for juvenile
crimes. Juvenile arrest and confinement rates have continue to drop reaching the lowest
since the 1980s. In 2016, about 850,000 youths under age 18 were arrested, which is about
half of what it was in 1997 (OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book, 2018). Similarly, confinement
rates in juvenile detention and correctional facilities fell by about half in the corresponding
years with less than 50,000 youth arrests in 2015 (OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book, 2018).5
The decline in juvenile arrests outweighed that of adults in nearly all offenses (Sickmund &
Puzzanchera, 2014). As the juvenile crime rate has trended down and with Congress passing
5 In 2010, the violent crime arrest rate reached the lowest level since the 1980s, with a decline to less than
250 arrests of juveniles under age of 18 per 100,0000 juveniles between ages of 10 and 17 (this is 55% fewer
arrests than during the peak at 1994). Juvenile arrests are about 10% of all arrests and 20% of all property
crime index offenses, liquor law violations, and disorderly conduct.
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the Second Chance Act, most states have once again shifted their focus to rehabilitation in
the juvenile justice system. Between 2008 and 2015, 39 state legislatures enacted statutes
that revised legislation related to juvenile records, which is the main focus of this paper.
B Mechanisms of Availability of Juvenile Record to Education
and Labor Market
It is quite common for schools and employers to have access to juvenile criminal records
in a slightly different way. At high schools, the most common mechanism is through di-
rect conversation with either local law enforcement agencies or from the court under school
notification law. Additionally, it is quite frequent to have offense take place in schools.
School notification laws are quite common across the United States. In 2008, 46 states
had some form of school notification laws (Sickmund & Puzzanchera, 2014), though there is
less guidance on protection and access policies on these information (Shah et al., 2014). In
contrast, the most common way for colleges to find out about a student’s criminal history is
through a question on the college application that asks applicants to identify their previous
criminal history (Shah & Strout, 2016). One national survey found that 60–80% of private
colleges and 55% of public colleges include a question about the applicant’s criminal history
in their undergraduate applications (The Center for Community Change & National Em-
ployment Law Project, 2014; Pierce et al., 2014; Stewart, 2015). For employers, the most
common mechanism is to ask consumer reporting agencies. Consumer Reporting Agencies
(CRAs) have a large dataset gathered from internet searches, court storage centers, or pur-
chased from subcontractors who gather arrest and conviction data from various resources
(e.g., state systems or issue reports).6
Prior studies have identified two theoretical frameworks for understanding the negative
consequences of a criminal record on educational attainment or employment: the stigma
6 There are some accuracy concerns about these data and how frequently they are updated regarding
sealing and expungement (The Center for Community Change & National Employment Law Project, 2014;
Shah & Strout, 2016).
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hypothesis and the behavioral hypothesis. The stigma hypothesis follows the labeling theory
where institutions, teachers, peers, college administrators, or employers change their way
of thinking about a student/applicant when they learn about the person’s prior criminal
involvement (Aizer & Doyle Jr, 2015; Kirk & Sampson, 2013; Lemert, 1951).. The behavioral
hypothesis suggests that their experiences in the justice system can have a negative impact
on youth’s behavior or skills such as, lowering self-esteem, creating detachment to schools, or
have less accumulation of human capital (Lambie & Randell, 2013; Nye, Short Jr, & Olson,
1958; Stewart & Uggen, 2018).
Alternatively, a far less studied mechanism is where information sharing can benefit in
allocating the resources to the population who needs it most (Bennett, 2010). That is,
information shared about a youth can help society efficiently allocate scarce resources (e.g.,
school counselors, parent advocate, parole/probation officer, and/or assigned school mentors)
to those students who need it the most.
This paper explores state changes in juvenile record policy that alters these underlying
mechanisms.
C Four Categories of Juvenile Record Laws
A juvenile record can refer one of two types of records: a law enforcement record or a court
record. The law enforcement record is created at the time of arrest and includes detailed
information about the arrest, police reports, detention and charging documents, witness and
victim statements, and if applicable, photographs, fingerprints, and DNA samples. These
records are primarily stored in the law enforcement agency’s record system (Shah & Strout,
2016). Second, the court record is created after law enforcement agencies decide to send
an arrest to the juvenile system.7 These court records include information such as fam-
ily background, behavioral and health history, education, and prior interactions with law
enforcement.
7 In 2010, 68% of arrests were referred to juvenile court (Sickmund & Puzzanchera, 2014).
10
Between 2008 and 2015, 39 state legislatures enacted statutes revising laws related to
juvenile records. I divide these laws into four categories:8
• Type 1: Expand information sharing to youth-serving systems - 11 states
• Type 2: Expand interagency information sharing (excluding youth-serving systems) -
16 states
• Type 3: Restrict public access to juvenile records - 9 states
• Type 4: Expand eligibility and modify procedures for sealing and expungement9 - 23
states
Figures 1.2–1.5 show the years that states enacted a revision law, separately by category.
The control states are those that did not make any changes to their juvenile record record
laws during the time period of this study, 2008 to 2015. There are 12 control states in this
study: Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana,
New Jersey, New Mexico, Rhode Island, and Vermont. These four types of record laws are
indicated separately into my difference-in-differences estimate to estimate individual impacts
on education and employment outcomes.
8 This categorization is adapted and modified from (Willison et al., 2010). Willison et al. (2010) makes
four categorizations: information sharing with youth serving systems, interagency information sharing, lim-
iting public access, and data collection on personal information (e.g. DNA, fingerprints, photographs, etc).
As mentioned before, I exclude the fourth category and consider laws related to sealing and expungement
instead.
9 Juvenile records are generally confidential. The term confidentiality means protected during or right
after juvenile proceedings. States have varying specifics of which records is confidential and not. For an
example, these vary in who has access, what information is accessible, and what type of offense. Also,
most states have exceptions to confidentiality by offense type, offender age, and repeatability of crime.
Law enforcement and court personnel are generally exceptions from confidentiality. In formal definition,
confidentiality refers to “preventing access to, dissemination or use of juvenile record outside of juvenile
court unless it is intended for youth’s case planning (Shah et al., 2014).” Confidentiality is different from
sealing in that sealing refers to protecting records after the case is closed. Although some states uses the term
sealing and expungement interchangeably, the two terms differ by whether it is access closure or physical
destruction of the record. In formal definition, sealing refers to “a record that is unavailable to the public,
but accessible to select individuals or agencies” and expungement refers to “actual physical destruction and
erasure of juvenile record (Shah et al., 2014).” In this paper, I use sealing and expungement terminology
interchangeably. Similar to confidentiality, sealing and expungement laws can vary in many dimensions across
states. States can choose which record is eligible (law enforcement and/or court), which procedure is needed
(automatic or petitioning), and how states can notify eligibility to recipients for sealing or expungement.
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III Data and Sample
The main dataset used in this study is the Current Population Survey (CPS) for October.
CPS data are collected monthly with a particular focus on labor force statistics. I selected the
October CPS in order to align with the academic year (starting in the fall and ending in the
spring), as two of the outcomes of interest are education outcomes. In addition, the October
CPS has a supplemental survey that allows me to separate out those who received GEDs from
those who received high school diplomas. However, using CPS data for my main analysis
has several limitations. One limitation is the sample coverage; CPS only collects data from
non-institutionalized individuals. Since I am interested in youth in contact with the juvenile
justice system, it would have been helpful to have the same information for institutionalized
individuals as well. This raises the question of how much of the sample is missing as a result
of this restriction. Fortunately, unlike the adult criminal system, the juvenile justice system
typically has relatively short stay in juvenile residential placement facilities. The median
stay among committed juvenile offenders ranges between 103 to 113 days. Less than 11%
of committed and 2% of detained offenders remain in residential placement more than a
year since admission (OJJDP Statistics Briefing Book).10 The short length of stay results in
only a small fraction of the sample missing from the data for any given year. Between 2003
and 2015, only 0.152 – 0.303 percent of the juvenile population aged 10 to the upper age of
juvenile court jurisdiction were in residential placement (Sickmund, et al., 2017). The second
limitation of using CPS is that it does not have a questionnaire asking about cumulative
arrest. Exclusion of prior criminal involvement limits my analysis to only able to estimate
a general effect of changes to record laws on the entire non-institutionalized population. In
other words, I am not able to disentangle the direct effect on ex-offenders with a juvenile
record from spill-over effects on non-offenders. In addition, without knowledge on how
10 Data is retrieved from OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book. Online. https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/
corrections/qa08401.asp?qaDate=2015. Released on June 01, 2017.
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large the affected population is by these law changes can raise concern on sample coverage.
Fortunately, since a juvenile record is created as early as at the time of arrest and the policy
change can affect anyone even with one arrest, coverage from the non-institutionalized sample
should provide reasonable sample coverage. Using National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
97, Brame, et al. (2012) calculates approximately 15.9 - 26.8% of the national representative
sample had more than one cumulative arrest by age of 18.
In order to gather record laws that were enacted during 2008–2015, I use the National
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) juvenile justice bills tracking database. This
database gathers all introduced or enacted juvenile justice statutes starting from 2008 to
the current date. From this database, I extracted only enacted legislation between 2008 to
2015 that fell under the category of ”Records and Information.”
Additional state-specific time varying variables are gathered from different sources. The
Bureau of Labor Statistics provides monthly, seasonally-adjusted unemployment rates for
each state. I take the average unemployment rate from the previous October to September
to align with CPS October calendar years. In addition, annual state specific juvenile arrest
rates including the violent crime index, the property crime index, and drug abuse is collected
from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Statistical Briefing Book,
which are calculated using the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) data.11 Lastly, log
juvenile population by state and year is gathered from the Easy Access to Juvenile Population
database from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
I restrict the sample to ages 18–24, which is the population most likely to be affected
by these legislative changes. Table 1.1 provides the descriptive characteristics of the sample
using CPS data for October during pre-treatment periods between 2004 and 2007. Columns
2 through 12 group individuals who lives in treated states by type of legislation. For each
category, three columns show sample mean, standard deviation, and p-values from a t-
11 The annual juvenile arrest rate is calculated using the number of arrests for a particular offense among
every 100,000 persons of ages 10–17.
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test comparing average differences between control group (columns 13–14). The legislation
categories are listed left to right from type 1 to type 4, as listed above. The two rightmost
columns present the mean and standard deviation for individuals in the control states.
In terms of outcomes, Table 1.1 shows that there is no significant difference in outcome
averages between the treated states and the control group. In contrast, the next rows pre-
senting individual demographic data demonstrate a few noticeable demographic differences
between treated states and control states. In particular, treated states are generally less
white (except for states that limit public access to juvenile records), less black, have larger
populations of other races, and are more metropolitan (except Type 3 states). Also, treated
states generally have higher juvenile crime rates, lower unemployment rates, and a high ju-
venile population. Particularly, states that reformed information sharing with schools stands
out with higher juvenile arrest rates than the control group.12The bottom panel of Table 1.1
shows that treated states and control states are spread out across regions throughout the
country.
IV Empirical Methodology
The main design of the study is a difference-in-differences (DD) strategy, where the model
compares trends in outcomes with control states before and after juvenile record reforms.
The simplest form of DD specification is:
yist = β1TreatPostst−1 + γs + δt +Xist +Xst + εist (1.1)
where, yist is an outcome variable for person i, in state s, during year t. Outcome variables
are whether or not one has received a high school diploma (excluding those with GEDs),
12 Similarly, I find higher rate of juveniles placed in residential facility for states that revised laws on
information sharing with schools. On average, 331 out of 100,000 juvenile population were in residential
facilities between years 2003 and 2007 (Sickmund, et al., 2017). On the contrary, 226 out of 100,000 juvenile
population were in residential facilities for control states during the same period.
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ever attended college, and employment status. TreatPostst−1 is an indicator with value 1 for
treated states in post-treatment years. I have a lag of one year to capture the gap between
enactment and implementation of the laws.13 The coefficient of interest is β1, an estimate of
pre-post change in outcomes among individuals in states that revised a law type compared
with those in control states. γs is a state fixed effect and δt is a year fixed effect. Xist are
individual controls and include indicators for living in a metropolitan area, gender, age, race,
and marital status. Xst are state-specific time-varying controls such as the unemployment
rate, annual juvenile arrest rates (violent crime index, property crime index, drug abuse
violations), and the log of the juvenile population (age < 18).
I enrich this basic model by first adding a state linear time trend to allow for differential
cross-state trends and second by adding an interaction of regional dummies and year dummies
to control for regional common shocks. I cluster standard error by state to address serial
correlation (Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004). Lastly, in order to allow for at least
one year of pre-treatment period for laws enacted in 2009, I examine outcomes from 2008 to
2016.
A Defining Treatment Dummies
Using the NCSL Juvenile Justice Bills Tracking database, a total of 165 records and infor-
mation laws were enacted between 2008 and 2015. Eleven laws (from six states) related to
allowing the collection of personal data (e.g., fingerprints or photographs) were excluded from
the analysis. The remaining 154 laws were assigned year t if the enacted date lies between
October of year t−1 and September of year t. For each law type j, treatedstatesj is defined
as those states that ever enacted a type j law during the study period. controlstate refers
to states that did not experience any amendment activity during the study time period.
This study uses a total of 12 states as control states: Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho,
13 the enacted law year t was calculated using both the year and month of the enactment date. That is,
to align with the data cycle of October, I assign laws that were enacted between the previous October to
this year September as belonging to the current year.
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Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, Rhode Island, and
Vermont. The TreatPost variable is coded as 0 prior to enactment and 1 after enactment
only among treated states.14 Within each law type, the majority of laws were enacted in
a monotone direction.15 However, if an enacted law is in the opposite direction to existing
law, then that state will have a missing value for TreatPost for all subsequent years.16
Figures 1.6–1.9 graph TreatPost values by year (one-year lag) along the x-axis, separately
by legislation type. Missing values indicate the year a contrasting law was enacted. For
type 1 laws (Figure 1.6), there are no missing values, indicating that all enacted laws had a
monotone direction. For type 2 laws (Figure 1.7), Maryland has missing values starting from
2014, meaning that a law was enacted in the opposite direction in 2013. Overall, Figure 1.8
confirms that the majority of laws were enacted in a monotone direction. In addition, Figure
1.9 shows that majority of revisions to records legislation occurred prior to 2013.
V Results
A Basic Difference-in-Differences Results
Table 1.2 provides results from the difference-in-differences regressions. Columns 1 to 5
contain the estimated impact of each law type on the likelihood of earning a high school
diploma (excluding GED earners), columns 6 to 10 on the likelihood of ever attending college,
and columns 11 to 15 on employment. For each outcome, the first column presents a simple
regression coefficient with state and fixed effects, the second column adds individual controls,
and the third column adds state-specific controls and are estimated using equation (1.1). The
14 Because I add a one year lag, the TreatPostst−1 indicate as 1 one year after the enactment year.
15 Here, direction is defined as protection versus sharing. For example, for type 1 laws (information sharing
with schools), laws that limit sharing with schools are regarded as being in the opposite direction of laws
that expand sharing with schools.
16 In cases where a state had multiple amendments within the same year t that were all in the same
direction, I treat the amendments as one. However, if multiple amendments within the same year had
contrasting directions, I exclude that year from treatment and replace the missing value for the TreatPost
variable.
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fourth column adds linear state trend and the fifth column adds region × year dummies in
addition to equation (1.1).
States that revised laws on information sharing with schools have, on average, a 1.7 to
2.5 percentage point higher high-school graduation rate (this is about a 2.0 to 3.1 percent
increase from the baseline of 80.5%) than the control states. Similarly, these states also have
2.0 to 3.5 percentage point higher rates on ever attending college (about a 4 to 7 percent
increase from a baseline of 50%) than control states. The coefficients are significant and
robust across all specifications. If approximately 16–27% of the general population had
at least one cumulative arrest (Brame, et al., 2012) and if the information sharing with
schools only effected directly on the population with a juvenile record, I would expect the
treatment effect size to be larger (about four to six times larger) in magnitude to those with
a juvenile record. On the other hand, Teske (2011) finds some evidence of positive spill-over
effects from multi-integrated systems through reduction in the number of students who are
detained on school offenses by 86%, reduction on school offense referral to the court by 43%,
and reduction in the number of serious weapons on campus by 73%. This suggests that
it is possible that information sharing with schools may have non-direct positive effects on
non-offenders through the mechanism of increasing safety of schools.
I find a suggestive increase in employment by 0.9 to 2 percentage points (about 1.4 to 3.2
percent increase from a baseline of 80.5%) for states that expanded sealing and expungement
eligibility compared with no-change states. The coefficients are positive across all specifi-
cations; however, two specification are not significant. Including state-specific or regional
trends reduced the magnitude of the coefficients on employment, suggesting that treated
states were already experiencing an upward trend in employment rates. In contrast, I do not
find any robust effects for states that revised laws regarding interagency information sharing
or public access to records.
Including linear state trends or region interacted year dummies generally doesn’t change
the direction of coefficients. However, the coefficients on ever attended college becomes
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slightly larger and less stable after including both specification. To take the conservative
estimate, I choose the simpler model, as specified in Equation (1.1), with state and year
fixed effects, individual controls, and time-varying state controls as preferred model for my
sub sequent analyses.
B Effects of all four laws simultaneously
Given that a mixture of law types were enacted during the study period, it may be worth




βj(Treat× PostLawtypej)st−1 + γs + δt +Xist +Xst + εist (1.2)
Furthermore, it may be worth exploring whether it is necessary to separate the data according
to type of legislation. To examine this issue, I create an indicator anylawst−1 that has a value
of 1 for periods subsequent to when any of the four type laws were enacted and 0 otherwise.17
This anylawst−1 is replaced from TreatPostst indicator from equation (1.1) above.
Table 1.3 presents regression coefficients from equation (1.2). The first four columns
estimate the joint impact of the four laws or any law indicator on the likelihood of receiving
a high school diploma (excluding GED), columns 5 to 8 on the likelihood of ever attending
college, and columns 9 to 12 on employment. The first column of each outcome is the
regression coefficient of equation (1.2), the second column adds a linear state trend, and
the third column adds region × year dummies. The fourth column indicates the regression
coefficient when replacing equation (1.1) with any law indicator, which equals 1 after any
juvenile record law revisions were made in a given state and year and 0 otherwise.
The significant and robust positive coefficients of information sharing with schools on
high school graduation rates and ever attending college is consistent with the findings in the
previous section. The estimation magnitudes in columns 1 to 3, between 1.1 to 1.4 percentage
17 If any laws were enacted in a conflicting direction within a same year and state, I replace that state
and year as missing.
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points, are slightly smaller than the separate estimations shown in Table 1.2, which indicates
that separating out one type of legislation partially captures effects from other the types of
legislative changes. However, no coefficients from other laws are significantly affecting high
school diploma attainment rates. On the other hand, the estimation magnitudes for columns
5 to 7, between 2.2 to 3.3 percentage points, are very similar to estimations that do not
include other record laws. This suggests that the educational benefits of information sharing
with schools remains positive regardless of the other types of laws that were enacted in the
same year.
I observe three patterns that deserve a mention. First, I find a suggestive negative impact
by 0.7 to 2.2 percentage points from states that enacted legislation regarding interagency
information sharing on ever attending college, which was not observable in previous sepa-
rate estimations. The significance level is not achieved across all three model specifications
(columns 5–7); however, the coefficients are consistently in a negative direction. It appears
that those states that made revisions to laws regarding interagency information sharing may
be correlated with another law with positive impact, which negated the negative effect on
ever attending college from Table 1.2. This finding suggests that subsequent analyses should
examining the joint effect of any enacted legislation. Second, the suggestive positive coef-
ficient of expanded sealing and expungement eligibility laws on employment still holds and
still, is marginally significant in only one specification after including other laws. Lastly,
columns 4, 8, and 12 indeed suggest that separating out the individual effects of each types
of juvenile record laws can provide better interpretations. Unlike the few significant estima-
tions from separating into four types of laws, none of the coefficients on any law indicator is
significant.
The results in Tables 1.2 and 1.3 suggest that information sharing with schools have
robust and significant positive benefits on both attaining a high school diploma and ever
attending college. The magnitude of the impact on earning a high school diploma is between
1.1 to 2.4 percentage points (a 1.3 to 2.9 percent increase from a baseline of 80.5%) and
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the magnitude impact on ever attending college is between 2.0 to 3.5 percentage points (a 4
to 7 percent increase from a baseline of 50%). In addition, I find a suggestive positive im-
pact from legislation that expanded sealing and expungement eligibility upon employment;
however, the findings are not robust across specifications. Using joint effect estimation, the
coefficients on interagency information sharing suggest a negative impact on ever attend-
ing college; however, this is not significant across specifications. In order for difference-in-
differences estimations to be valid, a critical assumption is the common trends assumption.
The following section provides assumption and sensitivity checks on these basic results.
VI Sensitivity Checks
A Pre-trends
Difference-in-differences estimates rely on the common trends assumption. The common
trends assumption requires that treated states and control states have comparable trends
without treatment. One way to check for parallel trends is to visualize outcome changes
by year in the pre-treatment period. Figures 1.10–1.12 show residualized outcome changes
between years 2004 to 2016.18 The residualized outcome is estimated using a regression
of state and year fixed effects, individual controls, and state-specific controls on outcomes
and plotting the residuals by each year. Year 2008 is excluded as a baseline. The red line
divides pre-treatment years and post-treatment years. Because my treatment is multi-year
law changes starting from 2008 to 2016, I am only able to plot the first year of the treatment
period. In order for the common trends assumption to hold, treated and control states should
have roughly similar trends prior to the first year of treatment, between 2004 and 2008. Note
that the common trends assumption is valid even the lines are at different levels, as long as
the pre-treatment slope changes are roughly the same. Reassuringly, Figure 1.10 indicates
18 In Appendix Figures A1.1 – A1.3, I directly plot outcome changes (un-residualized) by year. Generally,
I find similar trends during pre-treatment years.
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that the common treatment assumption holds; treated and control states appear to have
roughly similar pre-treatment trends. In addition, for significant regression estimators, one
may be able to detect trend differences between treated states versus control states during
the post-treatment period. Figures 1.10 and 1.11, which indicate the post-treatment trends
for high school graduation rates and ever attending college, show visible differences in trends
for control states from trends from states that made revisions on information sharing with
schools.
B Lags and Leads
An alternative way to check for the common trends assumption is to pool all years of data
and augment the data with beads of treatment indicator. If coefficients on leads have a
non-zero coefficient, the previous main results may be obscured from a reverse causality
interpretation. In addition, adding lags of treatment indicator would provide the dynamics
of treatment effects. To explore common trends assumption and the dynamics of treatment




βj(DLawtypej)st−1+τ + γs + δt +Xist +Xst + εist (1.3)
where, DLawtypet refers to indicators for 1–3 years before the enacted legislation, 1 year after
the enacted legislation, and 2 years or more years since the enacted legislation. I include
leads and lags for all four law types simultaneously, because there was correlation among
states that implement more than one type of record law as seen from the previous result.
Because I have states that enacted the same type of record laws multiple times between
years 2008 to 2016, I use all years between the earliest and latest legislation as the years of
enactment. For example, if state s enacted legislation expanding information sharing with
schools in both 2009 and 2012, the indicator for τ = −1 will have be 1 in 2008 for state s, 1
for τ = 0 in all years between 2009 and 2012, and one for τ = 1 in 2013.
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If the common trends assumption holds, the coefficients on the leads should be no different
from zero. The beta estimations on the lags will identify the dynamic nature of the treatment
spell. Figures 1.13 and 1.14 present coefficient plots for βj for information sharing with
schools on high school graduation and ever attending college, respectively. Figure 1.13
confirms that there is no evidence for reverse causality and that the positive impact appears
immediate after one year of enactment. However, from Figure 1.14, I find negative coefficients
for indicators 3 years prior to enacting legislation expanding information sharing with schools
on ever attending college. That said, it is quite hard to make reverse causality interpretation;
states made revisions to information sharing with schools laws as a result of low rates of ever
attending college. Figure 1.14 may indicate instead that my common trends assumption
only holds within a relatively short pre-treatment period.
C Aggregation Results
So far, my regression estimates use individual level data. An alternative model specification
is to aggregate individuals up to the state level and explore aggregated estimations on the
effect of juvenile record law revisions. The coefficients on state-level aggregate difference-in-
differences regressions should have similar point estimates with but different standard errors
from the main results. In order to align with the models using individual data, outcome
variables are residualized on individual covariates prior to aggregation in order to control for
individual differences. The state-level aggregated regression is modeled as follows:
y˜st = β1TreatPostst−1 + γs + δt +Xst + εst (1.4)
where y˜st is a residualized outcome from regressing individual controls. Table 1.4 presents
the regression results of equation (1.4). Reassuringly, the magnitude of the coefficients across
all specifications resembles that of the main results from Table 1.2. This confirms that my
aggregated model is equivalent to individual models. Even with state-level aggregated model,
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general finding still holds: information sharing with schools on earning a high school diploma
and on ever attending college is positive and significant. In addition, I still find significant
positive effects (three out of four specifications) from legislation that expanded sealing and
expungement eligibility upon employment. Thus the overall findings hold even with using
state-level aggregated data.
D Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
The findings in the previous sections consistently demonstrate the positive impact of ex-
panding information sharing with schools on educational outcomes. However, the underlying
mechanism of how information sharing with schools benefits educational attainment is not
as clear. Prior research has suggested that in sharing information on students’ involvement
with the juvenile justice system, schools are able to identify at-risk students and allocate
resources to taking preventative measures. This creates a more stable educational environ-
ment. To explore this hypothesis, I run a subgroup analysis on various demographic and
regional characteristics using equation (1.2). As changes in juvenile record legislation only
directly impact those who have ever been arrested, I would expect these legislative changes
to have the largest effect on the subgroup that most closely resembles juvenile offender
characteristics.
Table 1.5 presents regression coefficients on various subgroups. The coefficients only show
impact estimations from the states that made revisions on information sharing with schools,
although the actual regression includes all four types of record legislation simultaneously.
Columns 1–3 show difference-in-differences estimations on earning a high school diploma
(excluding GED earners), columns 4–6 on ever attending college, and columns 7–9 on em-
ployment, respectively. Column 1 reflects regression results from equation (1.2), column 2
adds linear state trends, and column 3 adds region and year dummies from equation (1.2).
The table separates the estimates by gender (males or females only), by race (black, white,
or other race), by age (traditional college-age, between 18 to 21, and older, between 22 to
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24), and by state indexes for drug abuse, violent crime, and property crime.
Across all subgroups, information sharing with schools has positive effects on high school
attainment and ever attending college. Given the larger magnitude on ever attending col-
lege, I find more coefficients reaching significance levels in columns 4–6. The male population
group and black population group have the largest significant effect sizes on both education
outcomes, which resembles the demographic characteristics of juvenile offenders. In partic-
ular, when looking at the male-only population, I find a 0.5 to 2.1 percentage point increase
on high school attainment and a 2.6 to 3.5 percentage point increase on ever attending col-
lege, which is slightly larger in magnitude than the general findings from Table 1.2. When I
restrict the estimate to the black population, the magnitude becomes even larger, between
a 1.9–4.8 percentage point increase on high school attainment and 2.0–5.8 percentage point
increase on ever attending college. The positive impacts of sharing information with schools
on education attainment and particularly on ever attending college are spread out across
gender and race. This suggest that there might be positive spill over effects from increasing
campus safety.
In terms of age, I find increased information sharing to have larger effects on the older
student population. One possible explanation is that students who have been in contact
with the justice system are less likely to graduate high school on time. It is possible that a
subgroup of young potential college students may still be in high school and that the benefits
might be as readily apparent for the younger population. Alternatively, the benefits may
take some time to reflect as an increase in outcome. For an example, additional resources
from information sharing with schools (e.g., counselors or mentors) may have behavioral
benefits (e.g., less detachment from school or less self-discouragement), which may appear
in the later life span.
The last three panels show regression estimates after restricting to states that have high
rates of juvenile crime and drug abuse, and high violent crime and property crime indexes.
Table 1.5 shows that the benefits of sharing juvenile records with schools are significant in
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states with high violent crime and property crime indexes. The heterogeneous treatment
effects by offense type reveals that records legislation may have a differential impact by
offense type.
VII Discussion
This paper looks at the impact of revisions to juvenile records legislation on education and
employment outcomes after the Second Chance Act of 2007. I identify four types of legis-
lation that address juvenile records: (1) expanding information sharing with youth-serving
systems (e.g., schools), (2) expanding interagency information sharing, (3) restricting public
access, and (4) expanding sealing and expungement eligibility. My difference-in-differences
estimates find increases in high school attainment and probability of ever attending college
for states that revised their statues to expand information sharing with schools. In particu-
lar, I find a 1.1 to 2.4 percentage points increase (1.3 to 2.9 percent increase from a baseline
of 80.5%) in high school diploma attainment and a 2.0 to 3.5 percentage points increase (4
to 7 percent increase from baseline of 50%) on the rate of ever attending college. My het-
erogeneous estimates indicate that treatment effects are largest among the Black and male
sub populations, which aligns with the demographic characteristics of juvenile offenders.
While the effects of juvenile records legislation have not been empirically studied, prior
research found similar trends. One case study that implemented a multi-integrated protocol
in Clayton County Juvenile experienced a 20% increase in graduation rates (from a baseline
of 60%) after implementation. However, this study did not control for any secular trends or
confounding factors, which makes it less compelling to compare with my causal estimations.
From Litwok (2014)’s paper, the model that is comparable with my analysis is the interaction
coefficient of juvenile arrest from living in automatic expungement states compared to non-
automatic(application) states, which finds a non-significant 0.3 percentage point decrease on
ever attended college and a non-significant 2.9 percentage point increase in log of average
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income. Although my suggestive positive outcome is on employment and not average income,
Litwok (2014)’s finding of positive labor market outcomes aligns well with my study.
The findings of this paper have several policy implications. First, information sharing
between schools and the justice system can help improve educational attainment rates in
the aggregate. Information sharing theory sheds some guidance on the possible mechanisms
behind this: improved detection of at-risk students and allocation of resources to take preven-
tative steps before at-risk students engage in more serious activities. This is consistent with
the findings in re-entry literature which shows that collaboration is key to successful re-entry
(Leone & Weinberg, 2010; Richardson et al., 2012). Second, I find suggestive improvements
from legislation that expanded sealing and expungement eligibility on employment. Lastly,
heterogeneous treatment estimations suggest possible implications for spillover effects on
the non-offender population. In addition, the differential effect sizes by regions with higher
offense type suggests that juvenile record laws can have differential impacts by offense type.
As a result of this paper, a few critical areas are identified for further research. First, it
is necessary to explore the underlying mechanism between information sharing with schools
and the juvenile justice system. How do schools re-distribute resources for a student who is
identified as at-risk? Does availability of schools resource matter? One possible scenario is
through changes in expenditures for student services or increasing the number of guidance
counselors. To examine this possibility, I used Common Core of Data (CCD) and estimated
my difference-in-difference regression. However, I did not find any changes in the number
of guidance counselors or total expenditures on student services among school districts that
have secondary level schools and are in a state that revised information sharing with schools
(author can provide these results upon request). This null finding is not surprising given that
re-distribution of resources is not equivalent to additional resources that these regressions
capture. Unfortunately, CCD does not contain information about distributional practices
of existing resources. In addition, learning the connection between high school intervention
as a result of information sharing to individual choices on college attendance can be critical
26
to understand further in my findings of improvement on ever attending college. Second,
differentiating out the effect of information sharing on ex-offender and non-offenders seems
important. My analytic sample relies on the CPS dataset, which includes both ex-offenders
along with youths and non-offenders. My heterogeneous estimations shed light on the possi-
bility of spillover effects of information sharing with schools for non-offenders. Unfortunately,
there is no direct way for me to identify whether an individual in CPS has a record or not.
Also, it is worth mentioning that CPS includes only non-institutionalized individuals, which
may result in underestimating the positive effects by excluding an institutionalized sample
who may be influenced by this legislative change. Third, it would be interesting to see if
any of the positive effects from information sharing with schools influence recidivism rates.
If redistribution of resources deterred at-risk students from engaging in further criminal ac-
tivities, we may be able to detect a decreased recidivism rate. Lastly, my differential impact
estimates by offense type raise the possibility that juvenile record laws can have differential
impact by offense type. It may be worth exploring the possibility of differential impacts by
offense type, which can have critical policy recommendations.
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VIII Figures
Figure 1.1: Historical juvenile arrest rates per 100,000 persons aged 10–17 (1980–2016)
This figure show historical juvenile arrest rates for aged 10–17, between 1980 and 2016. The y-axis
show arrested person per 100,000 juvenile population. Data source: Arrest estimates developed by the
Bureau of Justice Statistics and disseminated through ”Arrest Data Analysis Tool.” Online. Available
from the BJS website https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/ucr_trend.asp?table_in=1.
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Figure 1.2: Enacted revisions to juvenile record laws: Expand information sharing to youth-
serving systems, 2008–2015 (11 states)
This figure present geographical representation of states that enacted revisions to juvenile record laws
between 2008 and 2015. From yellow to dark red colored states indicate recent years of enactment.
Gray colored states indicate control states.
Figure 1.3: Enacted revisions to juvenile record laws: Expand interagency information shar-
ing, 2008–2015 (16 states)
This figure presents geographical representation of states that enacted revisions to juvenile record laws
between 2008 and 2015. From yellow to dark red colored states indicate recent years of enactment.
Gray colored states indicate control states.
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Figure 1.4: Enacted revisions to juvenile record laws: Limiting public access to records,
2008–2015 (9 states)
This figure presents geographical representation of states that enacted revisions to juvenile record laws
between 2008 and 2015. From yellow to dark red colored states indicate recent years of enactment.
Gray colored states indicate control states.
Figure 1.5: Enacted revisions to juvenile record laws: Expand eligibility for sealing and
expungement, 2008–2015 (23 states)
This figure presents geographical representation of states that enacted revisions to juvenile record laws
between 2008 and 2015. From yellow to dark red colored states indicate recent years of enactment.
Gray colored states indicate control states.
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Figure 1.6: Treatment assignment: Expand information sharing with youth-serving systems
This figure presents TreatAfter indicator by state and year. States that are included are states that expand
information sharing with schools. Treatment year is one-year lagged from actual law year. A state that enacted
law in a contrasting direction are indicated with missing values in subsequent years.
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Figure 1.7: Treatment assignment: Expand interagency information sharing
This figure presents TreatAfter indicator by state and year. States that are included are states that expand
interagency information sharing. Treatment year is one-year lagged from actual law year. A state that enacted
law in a contrasting direction are indicated with missing values in subsequent years.
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Figure 1.8: Treatment assignment: Limit public access to records
This figure presents TreatAfter indicator by state and year. States that are included are states that limit public
access to records. Treatment year is one-year lagged from actual law year. A state that enacted law in a contrasting
direction are indicated with missing values in subsequent years.
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Figure 1.9: Treatment assignment: Expand eligibility for sealing and expungement
This figure presents TreatAfter indicator by state and year. States that are included are states that expand
eligibility for sealing and expungement. Treatment year is one-year lagged from actual law year. A state that
enacted law in a contrasting direction are indicated with missing values in subsequent years.
34
Figure 1.10: Common trends assumption check: Probability of high school graduation
This figure shows adjusted common trends assumption check on outcome, probability of high school graduation.
The adjusted (residualized) outcome is estimated using a regression of state and year fixed effects, individual
controls, and state-specific controls on outcomes and plotting the residuals by each year. Year 2008 is excluded
from the regression as a reference year. The red line indicates first year of law changes in treatment.
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Figure 1.11: Common trends assumption check: Probability of ever attending college
This figure shows adjusted common trends assumption check on outcome, ever attending college. The adjusted
(residualized) outcome is estimated using a regression of state and year fixed effects, individual controls, and state-
specific controls on outcomes and plotting the residuals by each year. Year 2008 is excluded from the regression as
a reference year. The red line indicates first year of law changes in treatment.
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Figure 1.12: Common trends assumption check: Employment
This figure shows adjusted common trends assumption check on outcome, employment. The adjusted (residualized)
outcome is estimated using a regression of state and year fixed effects, individual controls, and state-specific controls
on outcomes and plotting the residuals by each year. Year 2008 is excluded from the regression as a reference year.
The red line indicates first year of law changes in treatment.
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Figure 1.13: Leads and Lag of Information Sharing with Schools on High School Diploma
This figure shows present coefficient plots for βj for information sharing with schools on high school graduation
and ever attending college, respectively. The x-axis indicate relative years since enactment from 3 years prior to
2 or more years after. All prior indicators except ”2 or more years after” have value one if relative year is equal
to τ . 2 or more years after indicator has value one for all years post 2 years of enactment. The bars indicate
95% confidence interval of each coefficient estimates. Samples are restricted to states that revised juvenile laws on
information sharing with school and control states.
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Figure 1.14: Leads and Lag of Information Sharing with Schools on Ever Attending College
This figure shows present coefficient plots for βj for information sharing with schools on high school graduation
and ever attending college, respectively. The x-axis indicate relative years since enactment from 3 years prior to
2 or more years after. All prior indicators except ”2 or more years after” have value one if relative year is equal
to τ . 2 or more years after indicator has value one for all years post 2 years of enactment. The bars indicate
95% confidence interval of each coefficient estimates. Samples are restricted to states that revised juvenile laws on
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I Introduction
Low completion rates at community colleges in the U.S. continue to present a grim picture.
Only about 24% of first-time, full-time undergraduate students who began seeking a certifi-
cate or associate degree earned that degree within three years of initial enrollment (150% of
scheduled time) at public 2-year institutions (McFarland, et al., 2017). Much of the prior
research on low completion rates has focused on students who discontinue enrollment early
(within one year) and on identifying factors that are associated with early-stage momentum
toward college completion, such as student family background, high school preparation, col-
lege enrollment immediately after high school, committed goal to completing a degree, and
full-time attendance (Adelman, 2006; Calcagno, Crosta, Bailey, & Jenkins, 2006). Jenkins
and Bailey (2017) summarizes first-semester and first-year momentum indicators that relates
to success: attempting at least 15 credits in the first semester and 30 credits in the first year,
passing a college-level Math and English in the first year, particularly for students placed
in remedial education, and passing at least 9 credits in college-level major courses in the
first year. This research has illuminated early-stage retention barriers but provided little
information about late dropouts who decide to leave college after their first year.
Unlike a handful of research on early dropouts, we know very little about students who
drop out in later years throughout the college process. Even more, we know very little about
the typologies of college dropouts. Recent empirical findings shed light on this search for
heterogeneous dropout groups. For an example, Stratton, O’Toole, & Wetzel (2008) find
that there are two groups of students who have distinctive characteristics among the second
year withdraws, a short-term stop out (who returns within a year) and a long-term dropout
(who do not return more than a year). Another study finds that, among students who drop
out from a two-year or a non-selective four-year institution in Ohio and Florida, about one-
third of the population leave college after completing 75% of their required degree credits
(Mabel & Britton, 2018). These close-to-completion dropouts face different barriers from the
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traditional early dropouts, for example, the transition to upper division coursework. Prior
findings suggest that different dropout groups can have very different reasons for leaving
college and it is important to understand the population and employ different supports and
interventions to help students achieve their completion goals.
In this paper, I use administrative data from a large community college system in a
single state. This study uses two analytic approaches, cluster analysis and classification, to
better understand dropouts at community colleges. The first analysis involves using cluster
analysis to identify different dropout groups (clusters). The second analysis uses classification
algorithms to build a reliable prediction model on each dropout group that can identify risk
factors.
Cluster analysis and classification algorithms have gained popularity in the education
data mining literature as the availability of electronic data tremendously grew, particu-
larly in the e-learning environment. Specifically, cluster analysis is used to analyze student
learning patterns or behaviors using web-login history, understand learning styles such as
content or environment preferences, or identify different e-learning student profiles (Dutt,
Ismail, & Herawan, 2017). Similarly, classification algorithms are widely used in an online
environment to model student characteristics, behaviors, predict performance, or measure
assessment (Pena-Ayala, 2014).1 However, both methodological approaches have rarely been
used applied in a traditional classroom setting, which is a common instruction form at US
colleges. The novelty and complexity of the algorithms limited its usage to researchers who
are in the field of computer science or statistics, however, have less familiarity in an educa-
tional context. Consequently, both methodologies have less been applied to administrative
datasets, which consist of greater detail about a student’s college experience. This paper
contributes to the literature by illustrating a practical use of these algorithms with adminis-
trative data to answer the most pressing issues in a traditional community college classroom
1 Pena-Ayala (2014), Romero and Ventura (2007), and Dutt, Ismail, and Herawan, (2017) provides a
comprehensive review of education data mining literature using cluster analysis or classification algorithms.
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settings.
Understanding dropouts can be particularly policy- and practice- relevant to the com-
munity college context. Community colleges enrollees are more likely to be on the margin
of college attendance given a larger proportion of non-traditional students and of open-
access admissions. Indeed, about 52% of students in the sample of this study remain as
non-completers (did not transfer to 4-year degree institution, have not earned a certificate
or diploma, and are not enrolled within six years after entry). This makes the community
college population a key target population for understanding dropouts.
As the preview of results, using hierarchical clustering analysis, this paper identifies
four typologies of dropouts: college trials (first semester dropouts), high-credit medium
dropouts, low-credit medium dropouts, and late dropouts. The four dropout groups are then,
matched to students who successively complete college and have similar enrollment history.
Three prediction models, logistic regression with elastic net, random forest, and gradient
boosting, are applied to model the prediction on completion by each dropout group. Using
10 fold cross-validation on the training set (70% of the sample), gradient boosting algorithm
performed the best with .719 to .868 AUC values. Variable importances suggest that each
group has a different set of variables that contribute most to completion. In specific, I
find third-year enrollment variables (i.e., credits withdrawn, full-time status, and remedial
credits attempted) largely contributing to predictions of completion among the matched late
dropout group. On the contrary, math and science credits earned in the first and second
year are most predictive of completion among the matched high-credit medium dropout
group. Similarly, gradient boosting performed the best on out-of-sample (remaining 30%)
prediction.
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, this paper identifies four
typologies of community college dropouts, who are in the margin of college attendance. I find
that these four groups have distinguishable enrollment patterns in two dimensions: the first
dimension is relative time since entry and the second dimension is attempted credits within
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each term. In addition, I find representative characteristics of the four cluster groups that
institutions can practically use to identify dropout types among at-risk students. Second, I
identify different sets of variables that are important in predicting completion within each
cluster group. This set of variables can provide guidance to institutions toward developing
targeted supports and interventions that address diverse needs. The targeted interventions
should accompany with efficacy study in order to make a causal interpretation, which this
paper cannot provide. In addition, I provide suggestive evidence that identifying dropout
typology prior to building an early alert system can improve predictive power. Lastly, this
paper contributes to the general education literature by introducing the usage of machine
learning techniques in a traditional classroom setting and applying matching to link cluster-
ing assignment with predictions using high dimensional data.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides background on
dropouts at community colleges. Section 3 introduces research questions and section 4
describes data and sample of this study. In section 5, I describe cluster analysis methodol-
ogy and present results. Section 6, I describe matching and classification methodology and
present results. Section 6 concludes.
II Dropouts at Community College
Among 2013-2014 first-time, full-time, degree/certificate-seeking cohort at a public 2-year
institution in 2013-2014, on average, 23.6 percent of students graduated with a certificate
or associate degree within 150 percent of normal time.2 For the past 13 years, graduation
rate has not improved and ranged between 19 to 24 percent. Among full-time degree seeking
students who entered a public 2-year institution between 2015-2016, on average, 62 percent
of students returned to school or have received a degree in their subsequent year since entry.
Although the term ”college completion” is defined differently by institutions, the term
2 Statistics retrieved from Digest of Education Statistics 2017, table 326.20.
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generally involves a time metric (e.g. within relative years since entry, 150% of published
time for the program), a particular subset of student composition (e.g. degree seeking or
full-time), and a measure of completion (e.g. degree attainment or transferred to four year
college). For an example, Federal Student Aid agency (FSA) defines graduation rate as
percentage of first-time, first-year undergraduates who complete their program within 150%
of published time for the program and IPEDS definition further restricts to full-time students
obtaining a degree from their first institution.3
At community colleges, it is quite common to use longer than the conventional 150% pro-
gram time (e.g., six years since entry) as matriculated students are largely non-traditional,
less academically achieving, and pursuing a shorter degree program (one year for certificate
and two years for an associate degree or four-year college transfer).4 The community college
system of this study also follows the six-year mark for their internal performance measures,
which I follow in this paper. It is worth pointing out that community colleges, in addition to
degree completion, have a mission to prepare students to transfer to a four-year institution.
As a result, a student who has transferred to a four-year college is counted towards comple-
tion. In this paper, I follow the definition of dropout commonly used at community colleges;
that is, my dropout population is defined as students who do not have a degree (certificates
or associates), did not transfer to a four-year college, and is not enrolled in their fall term
of the sixth year.
The process of student’s dropout/persistence choice in college draws upon three theoret-
ical frameworks; Tinto’s Student Integration Model (1993), Bean’s Student Attrition Model
(1985), and College Choice Nexus Model (St. John, Cabrera, Nora, & Asker, 2000). Tinto’s
(1993) Student Integration model suggests that student’s persistent choice is a function of
individual characteristics, academic performance, financial constraint, and social integration
3 Definition of completion for FSA and IPEDS is retrieved from https://fafsa.ed.gov/help/fotw91n.
htm and https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=40, respectively.
4 For an example, using Beginning Postsecondary Students (BPS) survey for 2003 cohort, a report shows
that about 8% received a certificate and about 14% received an associate degree within six years since entry,
which is about 10% higher than IPEDS graduation rate for that particular cohort (Ma & Baum, 2016).
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to college. Bean’s (1985) Student Attrition model adds environmental factors (e.g. employ-
ment opportunities) as another factor in determining student retention choice. The most
recent model, College Choice Nexus Model, is a combination of these two prior models and
adds a dynamic process in student’s choice.
Based on the three theoretical models, empirical research has demonstrated that good
academic preparation, marital and parental status, and sequential enrollment histories are
important predictors to completion (Adelman, 2006; Desjardins, Ahlburg, and McCall, 2002;
Willett and Singer, 1991; Ishitani, 2006). In addition, accumulating credit milestones, pass-
ing gatekeeper courses, and financial aid, particularly in the first semester, have shown to
have an important contribution to student’s choice to persist in college (Adelman, 2006;
Attewell, Heil, & Reisel, 2012; Bailey & Alfonso, 2005; Stratton, O’Toole, & Wetzel, 2008).
These empirical studies rely on the premises that dropout choices are identical across all
college students. However, recent studies find evidence that students who leave college can
have very different reasons (e.g., short-term stop out versus long-term dropout or early ver-
sus close-to-completion dropouts) and their needs for completion can be different. Given
these recent findings, it seems plausible to question the hypothesis on homogeneity decisions
of leaving college. This paper aims to fill in the gap by asking the following questions, (1)
are there distinguishable groups of students who leave college, (2) what are their different
characteristics, and (3) what are their different needs to improve retention? Are the needs
different by dropout groups?
III Research Questions
The objective of this study is to understand the characteristics of students who drop out
from community colleges. This paper has the following two research questions:
1. Among students who drop out, can we identify separable groups (clusters) of students
by using enrollment historical patterns? How are the demographic characteristics of
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each group different from each other? What dimensions (e.g., time) distinguish differ-
ent groups of students?
2. What are the important variables that largely contribute to predictions on completion?
And how do they differ by each dropout typologies?
IV Data and Sample
The administrative data for this study comes from all of the community colleges in a single
state (more than 50 individual institutions). The data consists of all first-time in college
students during Fall 2002 through Fall 2004 with 6 years of follow up information. The
data includes information on demographic data (e.g. dependency status, limited English
proficiency indicator, citizenship, in-state, race, age at entry, has prior entry flag), transcript
data (e.g. total term credits, college-level credits, and remedial credits attempted and earned,
grades for each term, number of withdraw classes by semester), financial aid information (e.g.
indicator and amount of pell, total grant, loan, and aid), credential data using the National
Student Clearinghouse (NSC) (e.g. received aa, certificate, or ba, semesters received in four-
year or for-profit schools within two through six years relative to entry), and earnings data
(e.g. monthly earnings, number of employment in each semester).
I restrict my analysis to fall cohorts to be consistent when using relative terms. Further-
more, about 4% of students who have missing values in their first-term GPA because they
had incomplete, withdrawn, unknown, or received other letter grades for all classes in the
first term are dropped from the sample. Around 50 students who are missing age at entry
are dropped from my sample, as well. The final sample included total 78,496 students.
The main population of interest is ”college dropouts” defined as students who did not
transfer, do not have a degree, and are not enrolled by their first term of the sixth year.
Figure 2.1 shows that about 52% of the sample are college dropouts according to this def-
inition. Table 2.1 provides demographic characteristics, enrollment history, and financial
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aid information about the sample. The first two columns describe the average character-
istics of completers and dropouts in my analysis sample, for comparison. The third and
fourth column present national averages from the Beginning Postsecondary Students (BPS)
2003/2004 survey, restricting to students whose first institution is a public two-year college
during the academic year 2003-2004. To closely align with the definition used in this paper,
the dropout sample is selected as students who are not enrolled and have no degree within
five years. The complete sample is selected as students who are either currently enrolled or
not enrolled but, have AA or certificate or transferred to a 4-year within five years. I use
the variable ”cumulative persistence and attainment anywhere in 2008-2009 (within 5 years
since entry cohort)” to distinguish between dropout and completer sample. This selection
resulted in 44% of a dropout sample, which is slightly smaller than my analytic dropout sam-
ple. From Table 2.1, I find that my dropout sample, on average, has less female, older, fewer
whites and more black, have fewer prior enrollments, and more in-state students compared
to my sample completers. In addition, my dropouts received more TANF, more financial aid,
earned less cumulative credits, and has a lower GPA, on average. Among my sample of com-
pleters, around 16% of students receive a certificate, 41% received an associate, 14% received
a bachelors, and 56% ever transferred to a four-year institution within six-year since entry.
Comparing to the national averages, my dropout sample has fewer females, more white and
black population, more US citizens, and less likely to receive any financial aid. In addition,
my sample dropouts have higher credits earned and higher GPA than the national averages.
V Cluster Analysis
A Methodology
The first step of my analysis is to find if any, there are distinct groups of students among
the dropout population. Cluster analysis is an appropriate technique to perform this kind
of analysis. Cluster analysis is used to group or segment a collection of objects into simi-
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lar subgroups, where similarity/dissimilarity is measured by a choice of a distance matrix.
Observations within the same cluster have smaller pairwise distances than with observa-
tions in a different cluster (Hartigan, 1975; Gordon 1999; Kaufman & Rousseeuw, 1990).
It is worth mentioning that cluster analysis does not aid in identifying the ”relationship”
between predictors and outcome class. Rather, cluster analysis is used to discover the under-
lying patterns of data without a target variable, outcome, and group data into meaningful
categories. Traditionally, there are two clustering techniques, hierarchical and partitional.
For my analysis, I choose Hierarchical Cluster Analysis (HCA) for my main analysis but, I
compare my analysis using Clustering Large Applications (CLARA), which is a partitional
approach in the appendix.
HCA has considerably been used in the education data mining literature to detect com-
mon data patterns in student profiles, activity, and learning patterns. For an example, Lee,
et al., (2016) uses HCA and heatmap to understand the patterns of student activity (e.g..
number of attachment views, discussion participation, etc) and its correlation to a final
course grade of a course. Nitkin (2018) uses HCA to examine pattern association between
instruction method and longitudinal academic outcomes, such as exit slip scores and content
levels for technology-based personalized instructions. The most relevant to this paper is
Bowers (2010), who uses HCA to analyze historical K-12 grading patterns and has linked
to dropout indicator. In the post-secondary context, Asif, et al., (2017) used HCA to group
students by yearly progression patterns of their indicators, which are derived from predict-
ing students’ performance from high school variables and first two years of college course
history. However, Asif, et al., (2017) analysis is conducted on a single degree program from
one institution resulting in a small sample size of 210 students in Pakistan.
The HCA algorithm particularly, an agglomerative HCA, is a bottom-up approach, where
every data point initially starts as a cluster on its own. At each iterative step, two most
similar clusters are grouped together building a hierarchical representation. The algorithm
stops when all of the data points are grouped to a single cluster. The entire iterative process
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represents an ordered sequence of groupings.
Several decisions are made by the user when implementing HCA. First, the user should
specify a dissimilarity measure between clusters that will be used to determine the next
two merging clusters. As suggested in the literature, I use uncentered Pearson correlation
to calculate the pairwise distance between observations and average linkage to calculate
intergroup dissimilarity between clusters (groups of observations)(Bowers, 2010; Romesburg,






















Using uncentered pearson correlation as distance metrix has several advantages when trying
to detect patterns on multidimensional data. One that is particularly useful for this study
is its ability to detect feature changes without neglecting absolute amplitude differences
(Anderberg, 1973). To calculate dissimilarity between two clusters, C1, C2, the average









The average linkage for calculating dissimilarity between clusters is particularly helpful when
addressing missing data in this study. The average linkage takes the average of pairwise dis-
tances between observations in one cluster to another cluster. For an observation with
missing values in the later relative years, the average linkage will pose heavier weights to-
ward earlier non-missing values when calculating the pairwise distances that involve this
observation. In other words, students who drop out at a similar time period will be grouped
together, depending on values in the earlier periods, adding an additional time feature to
the clustering algorithm (Bowers, 2010).
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A second decision the user needs to specify is the stopping criterion. HCA algorithm
continues to cluster until all observations are grouped into a single cluster. The recommended
stopping criterion is to stop when within cluster observations are very similar and across
cluster are sufficiently different. In my study, a good number of clusters should also have
policy meaning, which is not too small or big to have no policy implication. I show my
determination of the number of clusters through visualizing on the dendrogram.
One way to visualize the hierarchical structure of HCA is using a heatmap (Eisen et al.,
1998; Weinstein et al., 1997). A heatmap represents student as rows and enrollment variables
as columns, where the ordering of rows or/and columns aligns with cluster assignments. This
paper will use both heatmap and dendrogram to visually represent HCA findings.
Features(variables) used for clustering
In this paper, I use enrollment history, which is re-coded in relative years since the entry term
ranging from one to five years. The longitudinal features used in this clustering analysis are
term GPA, term credits attempted, term college-level credits earned, and the yearly number
of attended semesters from one to five relative years since entry. In order to reduce correlation
across variables, I use term variables instead of cumulative variables.
Pre-processing
In order to align entering semester and its relative terms across cohorts, I restrict my sam-
ple to only fall entry cohorts.5 The final dropout sample has 40,559 observations. For
implementation, all variables are standardized as recommended in the literature to prevent
over-weightening the similarity matrix (Romesburg, 1984; Xu, 2008).
5 For an example, fall entrants’ second semester is a winter semester and is not comparable to winter
entrants’ second semester, which is a summer semester.
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Missing Data
It is not surprising to have missing data for enrollment variables among the dropout sample.
Since the definition of dropout is determined at their relative sixth year, students who drop
out prior to their sixth year will have missing values for all of the consequent terms after
departure. For an example, a student who leaves college after their first year will have
missing values for term GPA, credits attempted, and college-level credits earned variables in
their second, third, fourth, and fifth year.
Fortunately, HCA can address missing values through the average linkage, which puts
more weight on non-missing variables for a student with missing value.
B Clustering Result
Hierarchal Clustering Analysis
The goal of the HCA analysis is to identify if any, a number of distinctive groups among
students who drop out from community colleges. The historical enrollment variables used
for HCA are: total credits attempted, college-level credits earned, and GPA in each term
and yearly variables indicating the number of semesters attended in the past academic year.
Figure 2.2 presents a dendrogram for a visual representation of the HCA result. The entire
hierarchical organization of the HCA is summarized with a vertical line representing an
individual cluster. The horizontal line indicates merging of two clusters at that iterative
step. The height in the left sidebar of Figure 2.2 illustrates inter-cluster distance at the time
of merging. At each iterative step (height), one can count the number of disjoint clusters
by drawing a horizontal line and counting the number of vertical lines that intercept. This
step is equivalent to stopping the HCA algorithm at a point when intra-cluster dissimilarity
reaches a certain threshold (height level). It is recommended in the literature to select a
height where there is a large height gap from the previous iteration (Hastie, Tibshirani, &
Friedman, 2009). In Figure 2.2, the red horizontal line indicates my decision to cut the tree
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at 4 clusters, which illustrates a relatively large height gap.
Table 2.2 indicates the distribution of cluster assignment when cutting my HCA tree at
4. As shown in Table 2.2, cluster one, two, and four are each distributed by about 20% of
the dropout sample. Cluster 3 has the largest share of 40%.
Figure 2.3 is a full visual representation of the four cluster assignment from the HCA using
both heatmap and dendrogram. Columns are aligned left to right in sequential order, from
earliest to latest relative term to entry. The x-axis is a list of variables that are ordered by
college-level credits earned, total credits attempted, and total GPA by each term. At the end
of each year, a total number of attended semesters within that year is listed. A dendrogram
is visible on the left sidebar with cluster numbers that align with Table 2.2.6 Each row in
Figure 2.3 represents a student in the sample. The center of the heatmap displays 4-levels
of standardized z-scores of each variable, where the blue indicates high quartiles, the red
indicates low quartiles, and the gray indicates missing values. Figure 2.3 shows that summer
enrollments are generally low. If any, the high-credit medium dropout group has slightly
more summer enrollments compared to other clusters but still has a low enrollment rate.
For an easier visual representation, I remove all summer terms in Figure 2.4. From Figure
2.4, it is clearer to see distinct characteristics of the four clusters in the dropout population:
Late Dropouts, Trials, Low-credit Medium Dropouts, and High-Credit Medium Dropouts.
The first distinctive pattern is a time dimension, which indicates when students leave college
(gray). Cluster 2, which is labeled as ”late dropouts”, are students who stay long (after
three to four years) before making the decision to leave college. This late dropout group
has been identified in Mable & Britton’s (2018) paper. Among my 2002 – 2004 cohorts,
around 20% of students are late dropouts, which is a slightly smaller proportion than Mabel
& Britton (2018), which was one-third of the dropout sample. One possible reason for
the different proportion is that Mable & Britton’s (2018) sample includes both two-year
6 Note, the dendrogram from Figure 2.2 is equivalent to the left-sidebar of heatmap in Figure 2.3. However,
Figure 2.3 heatmap rearranges rows to order students by clustering groups.
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and non-selective four-year institutions while my study is strictly restricted to community
college students. Cluster 3, which is labeled as ”trials”, is the largest share of my dropout
population (40%) and are students who decide to leave college immediately after their first
semester. Cluster 1, which is labeled as ”Low-credit medium dropouts” and Cluster 4, which
is labeled as ”High-credit medium dropouts”, are groups of students who decide to leave
college after one or two years. A second distinguishing feature across the four clusters is the
color of the heatmap body. The late dropouts have mixed academic performances, while the
trial dropouts have dominantly red colors that represent low-credits and low GPA students.
Color distinction is particularly clear between cluster 1 and 4, where I find that the low-
credit medium dropout group is dominantly red for variables total credits attempted and
college-level credits earned. In contrast, high-credit medium dropout group is dominantly
blue for those variables. 7
Characteristics of HCA clusters
I explore further with other variables that may provide additional information on the differ-
entiating characteristics of the four clusters. Table 2.3 – 2.5 present averages on demographic
characteristics, academic outcomes, and financial aid by HCA cluster membership.
Table 2.3 shows that the four clusters have a few distinct demographic characteristics.
The low-credit medium dropouts are older, less white, more high-school graduates, and
are more likely to be working at the time of entry. The late dropouts are largely young
females, across all race, and are in-state students. The trial group has a relatively large male
population, slightly older, less white, and less in-state students. The high-credit medium
dropouts are more white, less black, and more likely to be receiving TANF.
Table 2.4 reveals interesting enrollment patterns by cluster assignment. The low-credit
medium dropouts have lower credits however, not so low average GPA. One possible expla-
7 Appendix Figure A2.4 presents the heatmap that re-aligns observations by both row and column clusters.
This figure shows that the number of attended semester, credits attempted, and college-level credits are
clearly grouped to have distinctive patterns for each cluster.
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nation for this is that a not-so-low GPA may be because students attempted fewer credits in
the first place. One outstanding pattern for the late dropouts is that students in this group
resemble closely to remedial students, who have high remedial credits and low college-level
credits earned in their first year. Over time, the late dropouts catch up with total cred-
its attempted/earned and total GPA to behave similarly with completers. The trial group
attempts fewer credits and have more withdraws than any other groups. The high-credit
medium dropouts are very similar to completers. If any, these students earn more credits
in the first two years. Lastly, Table 2.5 describes financial aid characteristics by clusters.
The late dropout cluster and the high-credit medium dropout cluster receive relatively more
financial aid than other groups.
To summarize, HCA has identified four typologies of community college dropouts: trials,
high-credit medium dropout, low-credit medium dropout, and late dropout. By comparing
descriptive characteristics of each clusters, I find that the trials are largely male, older,
attempting less credits, and withdrawing a lot of classes in their first semester; the low-
credit medium dropouts are older, more people of color, are more likely to be working at the
time of entry; the high-credit medium dropouts resemble closely to completers and if any
difference, attempts too much in their first year; the late dropouts have high proportion of
young females, in-state students, resembles a lot like remedial students, and are receiving
high financial aid.
VI Classification
One of the drawbacks of cluster analysis is that it does not reveal any underlying relationships
between features and cluster class. Given that the two groups, the high-credit medium
dropout and the late dropout, have similar descriptive characteristics with completers, it
seems particularly interesting to identify what factors contribute to completion. In order
to explore this relationship, I need to first find a matching group of students who complete
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and have similar enrollment pattern that represents each cluster. With a matched set, I can
build a prediction model that will identify which variables contribute most to completion
and whether or not these important variables are different by clusters.
A Matching dropout clusters to completers
In order to build a prediction model, my first step is to find a matching completer (non-
dropout) group to each dropout cluster. Note that these completing students were initially
excluded when running the HCA cluster analysis. The goal of matching is to generate causal
hypothesis for my predictive analysis. That is, among students who have similar enrollment
patterns, what variables contribute most to having a higher probability of completion?8 In
order to create a matched completers by dropout clusters, my initial step is to identify the
medoid point of each dropout cluster; that is, the medoid point will be a representative
point of each cluster. I use a distance matrix, uncentered Pearson correlation, to calculate
the four medoid points, one for each cluster. The concept of medoid point is adopted from
the K-medoid algorithm, which assigns a point as the representative center of a cluster and
use that point to assign clusters to the remaining observations at each iteration. A medoid
point, therefore, has the minimum average pairwise dissimilarity with observations within
that cluster.
The distance matrix is chosen arbitrarily by the author, however, is used to align with
the distance matrix used in the previous HCA clustering. After I identify the four medoid
points of each cluster, I adopt from the k-medoids algorithm by assigning cluster number to
completer students with the smallest distance to its medoid points. Similarly, the minimum
distance is calculated using the un-centered person correlation distance matrix. 9 In order
8 The proposed idea is analogous to the idea of matching in social sciences.
9 Note that the choice of distance matrix is arbitrary. In Appendix Figure A2.5, I show the matching
results when using the Euclidean distance matrix instead of the un-centered correlation matrix. Both match-
ing results are similar except that the Euclidean distance tries harder to match the distribution of cluster
assignment with HCA dropout clusters. For an example, the Euclidean distance matching shows a greater
proportion of trials than that from the matching results from the un-centered correlation matrix. There are
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to avoid assigning a cluster membership to a completer student who has a very different
enrollment pattern from any of the dropout groups, I restrict my matching to a distance with
a caliper of 2 standard deviations away from each cluster mean. A completer student who
has bigger than 2 standard deviation distance away from the cluster mean will be dropped
from the sample. Among total sample of 37,937 completing students, 36,581 students are
assigned to a cluster.
B Classification Methodology
With this matched completers and dropouts groups, three classification models are used to
build a prediction model on completion, by clusters. In particular, I use logistic regression
with elastic net regularization, random forest, and gradient boosting classification algorithms
to build a prediction model. Tree-based ensemble methods, such as random forest and gra-
dient boosting, are appropriate for this analysis as my data have missing values and mixed
type of data (Hastie, et al., 2009). Also, ensemble methods are preferred over a single weak
classification tree because of the advantage of reducing variances. Up to date, Gradient
Boosting and Random Forest are one of the top performing ensemble models that are fre-
quently used in the machine learning applications (Olson, et al., 2017). I use {h2o}(2016)
for running the three prediction models.
A wide set of variables such as demographics, financial aid, earnings, and other enroll-
ment variables (e.g. remedial credits attempted and earned and math and science credits
attempted) are used to build a prediction model. It is important to mention that I intention-
ally exclude enrollment variables used for HCA clustering from my classification models.10
two reasons why I chose the un-centered correlation matrix for my main analysis. First, it aligns well with
my previous HCA analysis and taking correlation into account when estimating pairwise distance is more
reasonable given that my variables are varying only over relative time. Secondly, euclidean effort to match
the distribution between completing students and dropouts is not necessary given that the two populations
are expected to have different enrollment patterns, in the aggregate. As one example, one would expect to
see only a small fraction of students who leave college after their first semester among completers, while 40%
of dropout population were trials who left college after their first semester.
10 The proposed idea is analogous to excluding covariates that were used for matching the treatment and
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My final sample includes total 77,140 students (40,559 dropouts and 36,581 completers) and
278 predictors.
When running the prediction models, I follow the common practice in the field to hold
out a random set from the sample as a test set. In this study, I leave out 30% of the sample
as a test set. In addition, to tune the hyperparameters, I use Cartesian grid search for lo-
gistic regression with elastic net and random grid search for the remaining two algorithms,
random forest and gradient boosting. Further details on how I tuned my hyperparameters
are explained below. Across the three algorithms, I consistently use Area Under The Curve
(AUC) values as my main performance metric for both selecting the optimal set of hyperpa-
rameters and selecting the best model, as recommended in the literature (Bowers & Zhou,
2018).
One important dimension that contributed to distinguishing the four HCA clusters was
longevity of enrollment. In order to account for differences in longevity, I use a different
length of relative variables to include in each model. In particular, given the short enrollment
availability for the trial group, I use only the first relative year variables to predict completion.
For both the high-credits and the low-credits medium matched clusters, I use up to two
relative years variables to predict completion. Lastly, for the matched late group, I use all
variables up to five relative years to predict completion. As I vary the number of variables to
include in the prediction models across clusters, I would expect to have different predictive
powers by clusters. In particular, the group with more variables (e.g., late dropouts) would
have higher predictive power than the model with fewer variables (e.g., matched trials),
which is what I see in my analysis. However, as the goal of this analysis is not to compare
performances across clusters but, to select the best predictive model for each cluster, I
continue with my analysis with keeping in mind that I would expect differential performances
across clusters.
control from regression analysis.
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Generalized Linear Model with Elastic Net Regularization
The simplest approach for prediction is to fit a linear model, logistic regression model.
Given that I have a large set of predictors that can have strong correlations, I add elastic-
net regularization to my logistic regression model (Zou & Hastie, 2005). The minimizing




(−yiβTxi + log(1 + eβT xi)) + λ
p∑
j=1
αβ2j + (1− α)|βj|} (2.3)
Elastic net regularization is particularly useful when using highly correlated data, as in most
education data sets. By combining lasso (L1) and ridge (L2) regularizations, the elastic
net adjusts by averaging the highly correlated features (lasso) first, and then, shrinking the
coefficients of those averages to zero (ridge). Parameter λ controls for the shrinkage level of
the model, where a high value of λ shrinks more and equate a large number of coefficients
to zero. Parameter α controls for the balance between ridge and lasso regularization where,
α = 0 is equivalent to ridge only model, α = 1 is equivalent to lasso only model, and
0 < α < 1 is equivalent to elastic net model.
For my analysis, I tune my hyper-parameter α by using a Cartesian grid search on a
sequence of numbers between 0.1 and 0.9, by an interval of 0.1. The optimal α is selected
with a model that has the largest AUC value. For λ, the h2o platform embeds a λ search,
which starts from a maximum lambda value and efficiently searches through by decreasing λ
at each iteration until the minimum level is reached. Appendix Table A2.2 shows the result
from the grid search by varying alpha and its corresponding AUC values. The optimal α
values are shown in bold.
Random Forest
Random Forest was formally introduced by Brieman (2001) with the concept of bagging.
As one of an ensemble method of Classification and Regression Trees (CART), the Random
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Forest aggregates many single CART algorithms through bagging. The bagging algorithm is
a way of taking averages of a bootstrap sample that is applied to a weak learning classifier,
iteratively. By averaging many weak-learner classifiers, the bagging algorithm reduces the
overall variance. Random forest improves from a general bagging algorithm by using a
random subset of features at each terminal-node of a tree, which decreases the correlation
between trees and reduces average variance. By decreasing correlation between trees, a
random forest can reduce variance while, maintaining un-biasedness of a single tree. Random
Forest algorithm is specified as follows:
For iteration i = 1, .., B (bootstrap sample = B)
1. Take a random bootstrap sample (randomly selected observations with replacement).
2. Using bootstrap sample to grow a random forest tree Ti until minimum node size is
reached following,
(a) Select random m variables from p predictors’
(b) Select best split-point of a variable among the selected m variables
(c) At that split-point, make two child nodes
Finally, the average of T1, T2,...TB random forest trees for an observation x makes the
outcome prediction (either numeric or class). A splitting point is evaluated differently de-
pending on whether the outcome variable is continuous or categorical. In my example with
a categorical outcome, the best-split point is measured by taking the majority vote.
Random Forest has another advantage of only needing to tune a few hyperparameters.
For implementing the Random Forest, I follow closely from the Breiman & Cutler’s website.11
and Hastie, et al.(2009). I use {h2o.randomforest} for implementation (Wright & Ziegler,
2017).
The hyperparameters that I tune for Random forest are the number of trees to grow
(ntrees), the number of random variables to sample (m), and the terminal node size. Given
11 Accessed from: https://www.stat.berkeley.edu/˜breiman/RandomForests/
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a large possible combination of parameters, I use random grid search from the h2o platform.
Random grid search improves efficiency from a Cartesian search by at each iteration, ran-
domly selecting a set of hyperparameters from a user-specified hyperparameter space. My
stopping criterion is set to maximum running time as 40 minutes or if AUC value doesn’t
improve in the consequent 5 rounds by at least a tolerance of 0.00001.
• Number of trees to grow (ntrees): A large number of trees allows the model to stabilize
its error. On the other hand, growing too many trees can be inefficient since it takes
a greater computing time. I set my hyperparameter space for the number of trees as a
sequence of numbers between 1 to 1000 by an interval of 5.
• Number of variables to Sample (mtries): Number of variables to sample is an important
hyperparameter that controls error rates. Small m reduces correlation between any
two trees in the forest (which reduces the error rate) but also, reduces the strength of
each tree (which increases the error rate) (Breiman & Cutler website). In addition,
the proportion of relevant variable and m can be important for improving prediction
power for a model with large number of variables. Hastie, et al. (2009, pg 596) shows
that random forest can perform poorly for a small fraction of relevant variable and
small m. The default value for is sqrt(p). I allow mtries hyperparameter space to have
a sequence of numbers between 1 to 25, by an interval of 5.
• Maximum Depth of tree: Large depth of tree controls for the depth and complexity of
the trees. While a deep tree can improve prediction accuracy, however, too deep of a
tree can overfit to the training data. I allow maximum depth hyperparameter space to
vary between a sequence of 10 and 30, by an interval of 5.
• Terminal node size: A terminal node size is another way to control for how complex
your trees will be. A terminal node size controls for minimum number allowed at the
terminal node, which means that the smaller the node size, the deeper the trees will
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be. My hyperparameter space for the node size is a sequence of 1 to 30, by an interval
of 1.
Gradient Boosting
Gradient Boosting algorithm is originated from Ada boosting ensemble method (Friedman,
2001). A boosting algorithm, similarly as bagging, is an ensemble method that aggregates
many weak classifiers. However, the boosting algorithm differs from bagging in that the
algorithm builds up in sequential order by updating the weights from the previous iteration
step. In particular, at each boosting step, the weights on observations are updated by com-
puting the negative gradient of a loss function, which gives a higher weight to a misclassified
observation and a lower weight to a correctly classified observation. The final class decision
is made on a weighted majority vote of boosting step classifiers with higher weights on the
more accurate classifier. Decision trees are ideal to use as a base classifier for gradient boost-
ing. For implementation, I follow closely to the recommendation from Hastie, et al. (2009)
and Clike, et al. (2018) for using {h2o.gbm} feature.
The hyperparameters I tune for gradient boosting algorithm are the number of iterations
(ntrees: Number of trees), the size of each tree (max depth: Maximum depth of a tree),
the learning rate, and the fraction of the sample. It is quite common to apply shrinkage
techniques on a gradient boosting algorithm to control for prediction risk in training data.
Similarly to randomly forest, I use a random grid search with the same stopping rule of
maximum running time at 40 minutes and maximum tolerance of 0.00001 improvements in
AUC for the consequent five rounds.
• Number of Trees (M): A Large number of boosting iteration reduces the training risk.
However, too big of a number of trees can result in overfitting to the training data. I
allow hyperparameter space to be a sequence of a number between 1 and 1500 by 5.
• Size of Each Tree: Size of each tree controls for interaction effects. For J = 2, the
model will only consider main effects and for J = 3 the model will also include two-
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way interaction effects. Hastie, et al.(2009) suggests 4 ≤ J ≤ 8 as ideal range for
this parameter. Consequently, I allow parameter space to be a sequence of numbers
between 4 and 8, by an interval of 1.
• Learning Rate: Learning rate controls for shrinkage in the model. A smaller learn-
ing rate will shrink more and thus, increase the training risk for a given number M.
Hastie, et al.(2009) suggest for setting a small learning rate (v < 0.1). I allow this
hyperparameter space to have a sequence number between 0.01 and 0.1, by interval
0.1.
• Fraction of subsample (η): A typical choice for η = 1/2. However, for large N, Hastie,
et al. (2009) suggest a smaller choice of this parameter. My parameter space for η is
0.1, 0.25, and 0.5.
C Classification Results
Matching Results: Assigning cluster groups to completers
Figure 2.5 illustrates heatmap visual representation of the matched clusters for completer
students. Table 2.6 shows the distribution of cluster assignments for students who do not
drop out from community colleges. Both Figure 2.5 and Table 2.6 illustrates that proportions
of the matched trial group and the matched low-credit medium group are smaller than that
of HCA dropout groups (about 27% compared to 42% and about 18% compared to 20%,
respectively). Also, the proportion of the matched late group and the matched high-credit
medium group are bigger than that from the HCA groups (about 23% compared to 18% and
about 33% compared to 21%, respectively). Given that matching is among students who
do not drop out, it is not surprising to see a different share of students in each group that
resembles dropout enrollment patterns. In particular, I find a smaller proportion of completer
students with similar enrollment patterns with the dropout trials and the low-credit medium
dropout group.
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10-fold Cross Validation Performances
Using the matched groups, I run three prediction models on a random 70% of the sample
as my training set. To tune my hyperparameters, I split this training set into 10-fold to
calculate the averages of the 10-fold cross validation performance metrics for each set of hy-
perparameters. The best set of hyperparameters are selected with the model with the largest
AUC value. Table 2.7 presents averages and standard errors of the 10-fold cross validations
performances. The first two columns indicate performance measures among the matched
low-credit medium group, columns three and four indicate performances among the late
dropouts and its matched completers, columns five and six indicate performances among the
trial dropouts and its matched students, and final two columns indicate performances among
the high-credit medium dropout and its matched completed students. Top to bottom panel
shows performance measures of the three prediction models: logistic regression with elastic
net, random forest, and gradient boosting. Each model is illustrated using five performance
metrics; accuracy, which is the proportion of true positive and negative predictions over
all possible predictions made; AUC value, which is the area under the Receiver Operating
Characteristics (ROC) curve; precision, which is the true positive prediction overall positive
predictive values; recall, which is the true positive portion overall true positive cases; and
specificity, which is the true negative portion of the all negative cases in the data.
Across the three models, the trial group has the lowest performance measures with ranging
between .677 to .719. This is not surprising given that I am only using one relative year
variables to predict completion, as mentioned before. The low-credit medium matched group
is the second lowest with AUC values ranging between .748 to .759 and is the group with
the smallest difference across models. On the other hand, the matched high-credit medium
and the matched late groups have large AUC values across all of the three models that are
ranging between .815 to .849 and .829 to .868, respectively.
Gradient boosting model is by far the best performing model across the four clusters.
Random forest, generally, is the second best and the logistic model with elastic net performing
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the worst. One exception where the logistic model with elastic net outperforms random forest
is among the matched late trials. Overall, ensemble methods slightly improved performance
compared to the generalized linear model by AUC values of around .011 to .042. Comparing
to the previous findings from Knowles (2015), my findings are consistent in that gradient
boosting out-performs random forest and the generalized linear model. In terms of AUC
value, my AUC values are generally lower than Knowles (2015) except for the prediction on
completion among the matched late dropout group, which had an AUC value of .868. One
possible reason for a generally lower prediction power may be because Knowles (2015) uses
high school data to create an early warning system while this paper uses college-level data to
predict completion that is determined in the sixth year. It is worth mentioning that despite
my AUC values differ slightly from Knowles (2015), it generally falls under a wide range of
performance measures evaluated by Knowles(2015) using different algorithms.
Variable Importance
In order to better understand the relationship between variables and completion, I choose
the best performing gradient boosting model (with the highest AUC values) and compute
the relative variable importances. Variable importance is embedded in tree-based models
and is calculated using the number of times a variable is selected at each splitting node.
A variable is selected at each node when that variable reduces the maximum amount of
squared error risk. Variable importance in a single tree is measured by taking the sum of
this reduced squared error risk every time that variable is selected as a node. In an ensemble
method, relative variable importance is calculated by averaging the importance measures for
that variable obtained from a single tree (Hastie, et al., 2009). It is worth mentioning that
important variables have no causal interpretation of the relationship between variables and
outcome. The variables are measured in relative values with 100 being the most important
variable and then scaling down.
Figures 2.6–2.9 show top 20 variables with the highest values in relative variable impor-
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tance. Figure 2.6 present important variables for the matched trials group, Figure 2.7 for the
matched low-credit medium group, Figure 2.8 for the matched high-credit medium group,
and Figure 2.9 for the matched late group. As shown in Figure 2.6, the top three most
important variables for explaining completion among the matched trial group are net tuition
in their first year and age at entry. The top three most important variables for explain-
ing completion among the matched low-credit dropout group are % of credits withdrawn
in the spring of the 2nd year, age at entry, and remedial credits attempted in the spring
term of the 2nd year (see Figure 2.7). For the matched high-credit dropout group, the most
important variables are math and science cumulative credits earned by spring of 2nd and
1st year and % of credits withdrawn in the spring of the 2nd year (see Figure 2.8). This
suggests that among students who attempt and earn low-credits during their first two years,
students who withdraw less and attempts more remedial classes in their second year have a
higher probability in completing college. On the contrary, among students who attempt and
earn high-credits within their first two years, students with high cumulative credits earned
in math and science have a high probability of completion. It is also worth noting that net
tuition appears as the next important variable for predicting completion. As shown in Figure
2.9, the matched late dropout group have credits withdrawn, full-time status in their spring
semester of third year, and remedial credits attempted in the fall of their third year as the
most important three variables in predicting completion.
Out-of-sample prediction and ROC curves
Up til now, my performance measures were based on the predictive model using 10-fold
cross-validation from the training sample (70% of the entire sample). Table 2.8 present
performance measures (AUC value) for out-of-sample prediction model (the remaining 30%
of the sample) using the three models: logistic regression and elastic net, random forest, and
gradient boosting. The hyperparameters are obtained from the best performing model from
the previous 10-fold cross-validation models. Reassuringly, the out-of-sample AUC values are
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very similar to 10-fold cross-validation performances suggesting that the models are not over-
fitting to training dataset. Figures 2.10 – 2.13 draw ROC curves for the three classification
methods using out-of-sample predictions. The x-axis indicate false positive rates and the
y-axis indicate true positive rates. ROC curves for the trial matched group (see Figure 2.10)
indicates that gradient boosting and random forest algorithms outperform logistic regression
with elastic net algorithm. However, for the matched low-credit medium group (see Figure
2.11), the three predictive models are not very distinguishable. This is consistent with my
prior findings from the 10-fold cross-validation. On the other hand, Figure 2.12 indicates
that there is a clear performance difference for the matched high-credit medium group with
gradient boosting model being the best performing model. Figure 2.13 is interesting as the
performance for the logistic regression model with elastic net is better than that for the
random forest. Nonetheless, gradient boosting algorithm performed best for this group, as
well. From all four matched clusters, gradient boosting outperformed any other prediction
models even with the 30% leave-out sample. This is consistent with my previous findings
from the10-fold cross-validation.
VII Conclusion
This paper identified four typologies of community college dropout using hierarchical cluster
analysis. The four dropout groups are trials (dropout after 1st semester), high-credit medium
dropouts, low-credit medium dropouts, and late dropouts. Among my dropout sample,
around 20% are each distributed to the low-credit medium, high-credit medium, and late
clusters. The remaining 40% of the sample is assigned to the trial group.
Exploring demographic characteristics of each cluster, I find that the trial and the low-
credit medium clusters have more males, older population, and fewer whites. On the other
hand, the high-credit medium cluster has more whites and the late cluster has more young
females across all race. In terms of academic achievement, the trials and the low-credit
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medium clusters attempt and earn fewer credits. Despite low credits earned, the low-credit
medium dropout cluster does not necessarily have low GPAs. The high-credit medium cluster
aligns very closely with students who complete college and if any, attempts too much during
the first year. The late dropouts characterize closely to remedial students who take a lot of
remedial classes in their first year.
Given the distinctive characteristics of dropout clusters, I match students who complete
and have similar enrollment history to dropout clusters. Within the matched clusters, I
predict completion using three classification algorithms, logistic regression with elastic net,
random forest, and gradient boosting. Across the three prediction models, I find that gra-
dient boosting performs the best. The AUC values for both 10-fold cross-validation and
out-of-sample using gradient boosting ranges between .719–.868 and .713–.867, respectively.
Examining variable importance measures from the best gradient boosting model, I find that
each of the four clusters has a different set of important variables that contribute largely to
predicting completion. In particular, for the trial group, net tuition in their first semester
contribute most to predicting completion. For the matched low-credit group, I find that
credits withdrawn and age at the entry contributes most in predicting completion. For the
matched high-credit group, I find that math and science cumulative credits earned by their
second year explains most in predicting completion. Finally, for the matched late dropout
group, credits withdrawn and full-time status in their third year explained most in predicting
completion.
This paper provides suggestive evidence that categorizing the dropout population first,
helps to better understand the needs for completion. First, the variable importances suggest
that dropout groups (i.e., clusters) have a different set of variables that contribute largely to
completion. This indirectly suggests that students who dropouts can have different needs for
completion and grouping at-risk population by similar enrollment patterns could help iden-
tify the heterogeneous needs. Secondly, to compare the predictive power between grouping
dropouts as a single group versus separating into four clusters, I compare AUC performances
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when using the same logistic regression with elastic net but, when treating dropout as one
population. Similarly, to address longevity, I run five models with a different set of longevity
variables; that is, using only first-year variables, one and second-year variables, and so on,
up to including all five relative year variables. Table 2.9 shows that average AUC values of
the 10-fold cross validation using dropout as one group has smaller prediction power than
my AUC values using clustering and matching. The only exception is the matched trial
group, which performed less than using one-year variables and treating dropout as a single
group. For example, both high-credit and low-credit medium dropout groups have higher
AUC (.815 and .748) than a prediction model that uses up to second relative year variables
(.740). My late dropout prediction power is even far better than a prediction model that uses
up to five relative year variables (0.846 versus 0.788). This comparison provides suggestive
evidence that separating out the dropout population by four clusters and then building a
prediction model can have higher prediction power.
It is worth mentioning the limitation of this paper. Although cluster analysis is useful
in identifying the four groups of dropout, it is not clear how institutions can identify which
group at-risk students are in prior to dropping out of college as one of the two metrics
that identify groups is time of departure. This suggests for future work to develop a good
predictive model that can identify dropout typologies using college first-year information.
To conclude, this paper identifies that there are four distinct groups in the dropout
population at a large community college system within a single state. In specific, the four
distinct groups are trials, high-credit medium dropouts, low-credit medium dropouts, and
late dropouts. The findings of this paper will provide guidelines to community colleges in
understanding the typologies of college dropouts. Institutions can use two dimensions of
enrollment patterns to distinguish at-risk student types: relative time of entry and total
credits attempted and earned by term. Furthermore, by matching students who complete
to each of the four distinct dropout groups by using similarity in enrollment patterns, I find
that different groups have different set of variables that are contributing most in predicting
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completion. Particularly, for late dropouts, I find that percentage of credits withdrawn
and having full-time enrollment in the third year matters most in improving probability of
completion. This suggests that providing additional support in student’s third year can help
in reducing the probability of dropping out among students who are enrolled beyond their
second year. Second, I find that higher credits earned in math and science during the first
two years contributes importantly in increasing the probability of completion among students
who have relatively good grades and high credits in the first two years. This suggests that
institutions should promote students in taking math and science courses early in the first
two years even for those who may be doing relatively well. Lastly, the differential needs for
completion for each dropout typology suggests that it is important for institutions to create
standard practices in identifying at-risk dropout types and employ group-specific supports
and interventions to help students achieve their completion goal.
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VIII Figures
Figure 2.1: Dropouts Proportion (51.7%)
This figure shows the proportion of dropouts in the analysis sample, which are restricted
to students in 2002 - 2004 fall entry cohorts. Dropouts is defined as students who do
not receive a degree or certificate, did not transfer to a four-year institution, and is not
enrolled in first semester of the sixth year of community college entry.
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Figure 2.2: HCA Cluster Dendrogram
This figure shows dendrogram for my hierarchical clustering analysis. Each vertical line
represent each cluster and vertical line show cluster merges. The height represent intra-



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.6: Variable Importance Plot for Trials
This figure show top 20 variable importance plot for prediction model on completion using gradient
boosting algorithm among Trials dropout and matched students who complete. Variables are ranked
from top to bottom by its relative influence on outcome. The x-axis indicate scaled relative importance
that lies between zero and one.
Figure 2.7: Variable Importance Plot for Low-Credit Medium Dropouts
This figure show top 20 variable importance plot for prediction model on completion using gradient
boosting algorithm among low-credit medium dropout and matched students who complete. Variables
are ranked from top to bottom by its relative influence on outcome. The x-axis indicate scaled relative
importance that lies between zero and one.
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Figure 2.8: Variable Importance Plot for High-Credit Medium Dropouts (bottom)
This figure show top 20 variable importance plot for prediction model on completion using gradient
boosting algorithm among high-credit medium dropout and matched students who complete. Variables
are ranked from top to bottom by its relative influence on outcome. The x-axis indicate scaled relative
importance that lies between zero and one.
Figure 2.9: Variable Importance Plot for Late Dropouts
This figure show top 20 variable importance plot for prediction model on completion using gradient
boosting algorithm among late dropout and matched students who complete. Variables are ranked
from top to bottom by its relative influence on outcome. The x-axis indicate scaled relative importance
that lies between zero and one.
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Figure 2.10: ROC Curves for Trials
This figure show receive operating characteristic (ROC) curve for out-of-sample prediction models
using logistics regression with elastic net (green), random forest (blue), and gradient boosting (red).
Sample is restricted to trial dropout and matched students who complete, among 2002-2004 fall entry
cohorts.
89
Figure 2.11: ROC Curves for Low-Credit Medium Dropouts
This figure show receive operating characteristic (ROC) curve for out-of-sample prediction models
using logistics regression with elastic net (green), random forest (blue), and gradient boosting (red).
Sample is restricted to low-credit medium dropout and matched students who complete, among 2002-
2004 fall entry cohorts.
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Figure 2.12: ROC Curves for High-Credit Medium Dropouts
This figure show receive operating characteristic (ROC) curve for out-of-sample prediction models
using logistics regression with elastic net (green), random forest (blue), and gradient boosting (red).
Sample is restricted to high-credit dropout and matched students who complete, among 2002-2004 fall
entry cohorts.
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Figure 2.13: ROC Curves for Late Dropouts
This figure show receive operating characteristic (ROC) curve for out-of-sample prediction models
using logistics regression with elastic net (green), random forest (blue), and gradient boosting (red).





Table 2.1: Sample Characteristics of 2002-2004 Cohort by Dropout Indicator
Sample Sample National Avg. National Avg.
Variable Completers Dropouts Completers Dropouts
Female 0.584 0.543 0.574 0.572
Age at entry (years) 23.492 25.184 22.319 25.911
Race
White 0.707 0.676 0.641 0.578
Black 0.206 0.236 0.128 0.148
Hispanic 0.03 0.031 0.195 0.135
Other Race 0.057 0.058 0.09 0.078
Citizenship 0.986 0.988 0.920 0.937
High School Graduates (%) 0.884 0.895 0.983 0.993
Inmate 0.023 0.019 N/A N/A
Instate 0.907 0.932 N/A N/A
Limited English Proficiency 0.004 0.004 N/A N/A
Has prior enrollment 0.116 0.084 0.213 0.143
Received TANF 0.075 0.091 N/A N/A
Working 0.566 0.565 0.729 0.787
Financial Aid (first term)
Received any aid 0.364 0.385 0.544 0.530
Amount total aid ($, Incl.0s) 545.605 596.292 1776.676 1407.05
Received any grant 0.335 0.366 0.476 0.458
Amount total grant ($, Incl.0s) 485.291 546.705 1241.872 942.219
Has any loan 0.024 0.023 0.114 0.114
Among total loan ($, Incl.0s) 34.655 31.583 317.766 304.505
Enrollment
Total missed semesters by year 3 4.428 6.022 N/A N/A
Cum. credits earned by year 3 60.2 47.8 51.872 23.719
Cum. college-level credits earned by year 3 55.7 43.0 N/A N/A
Cumulative GPA by year 3 2.92 2.634 2.937 2.558
Degree Attainment
Received certificate by year 6 0.159 0 0.115 0
Received associates by year 6 0.413 0 0.259 0
Received bachelors by year 6 0.136 0 0.227 0
Ever transferred to 4-year by year 6 0.556 0 0.517 0
Sample Size 37,937 40,599 9,028 7,094
Note. Columns 1-2 are the analysis sample of 2002-2004 fall entry cohort students. Columns 3-4 show av-
erages for the national representative BPS 2003/2004 sample, restricted to those whose first institution is
at a public two-year college for the first time in academic year 2003-2004. Column 3 is averages of a sample
who is enrolled or not enrolled and have AA, certificate, or transferred to a 4-year or students enrolled, no
degree from variable, cumulative persistence and attainment anywhere in 2008-2009. Column 4 is averages
of a sample who is not currently enrolled and do not have a degree using variable, cumulative persistence
and attainment anywhere in 2008-2009.
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Table 2.2: HCA Clustering Distribution
HCA Clustering Sample Size %
1 (Low-credit Medium Dropouts) 7978 19.67
2 (Late Dropouts) 7127 17.57
3 (Trials) 16959 41.81
4 (High-credit Medium Dropouts) 8495 20.94
Note. Samples are restricted to dropouts among 2002-2004 fall
entry cohort students. This table shows distribution of cluster
assignment from hierarchical clustering analysis. First column
indicates cluster assignments, second column is sample size of
each cluster, and third column indicates sample proportions of
each clusters.
Table 2.3: HCA Demographic Characteristics
Low-credit Late High-credit
Variables Medium Dropout Dropouts Trials Medium Dropouts Completers
Female 0.604 0.632 0.484 0.531 0.584
Age at entry 27.492 22.333 25.529 24.717 23.492
White 0.673 0.681 0.650 0.724 0.707
Black 0.235 0.233 0.260 0.189 0.206
Hispanic 0.033 0.025 0.033 0.029 0.030
Other Race 0.059 0.061 0.056 0.057 0.057
Citizenship 0.984 0.987 0.990 0.990 0.986
High School Graduates 0.910 0.879 0.897 0.892 0.884
Inmate 0.012 0.006 0.027 0.021 0.023
Instate 0.932 0.953 0.916 0.943 0.907
Limited English Proficiency 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.004
Has prior enrollment 0.078 0.098 0.076 0.093 0.116
Received TANF 0.083 0.093 0.087 0.103 0.075
Working 0.621 0.581 0.561 0.506 0.566
Note. Columns 1–4 are restricted to dropouts among 2002-2004 fall entry cohorts. Column 1 present demo-
graphic averages among low-credit medium dropout cluster, column 2 is for late dropout cluster, column 3 is for
trial cluster, and column 4 is for high-credit medium dropout cluster. Column 5 shows averages for completers
among 2002-2004 fall entry cohorts.
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Table 2.4: HCA Enrollment History
Low-Credit Late High-Credit
Variables Medium Dropout Dropouts Trials Medium Dropouts Completers
total credits attempted
year1,fall 8.058 10.318 8.292 12.962 11.102
year1,spring 14.682 18.336 10.279 25.367 20.230
end of year 1 15.680 19.333 10.346 28.362 22.160
end of year2 22.551 32.319 11.171 41.161 37.718
end of year3 24.599 44.406 11.525 43.251 46.680
end of year4 25.003 52.706 11.624 43.586 51.942
remedial credits attempted
year1,fall 2.039 2.411 1.138 1.652 1.515
year1,spring 1.077 1.184 0.169 0.808 0.704
year2,fall 0.401 0.448 0.042 0.192 0.252
year2,spring 0.181 0.244 0.028 0.092 0.134
number of course withdraws
year1,fall 0.254 0.316 0.570 0.152 0.227
year1,spring 0.442 0.366 0.258 0.228 0.241
year2,fall 0.320 0.283 0.056 0.215 0.182
year2,spring 0.208 0.256 0.027 0.211 0.159
cum. college-level credits earned
year1,fall 4.257 5.530 4.512 9.730 8.130
year1,spring 8.574 10.732 5.167 20.145 15.675
end of year1 9.332 11.455 5.212 22.781 17.400
end of year2 14.077 22.003 5.731 33.926 31.690
end of year3 15.734 32.849 5.988 35.612 40.169
end of year4 16.091 40.369 6.063 35.904 45.189
cum. GPA
end of year1 3.112 2.686 1.886 2.942 3.159
end of year2 2.888 2.615 1.773 2.918 3.058
end of year3 2.926 2.621 1.815 2.702 2.920
end of year4 3.019 2.515 1.896 2.576 2.822
Note. Columns 1–4 are restricted to dropouts among 2002-2004 fall entry cohorts. Column 1 presents averages of
enrollment history among low-credit medium dropout cluster, column 2 is for late dropout cluster, column 3 is for
trial cluster, and column 4 is for high-credit medium dropout cluster. Column 5 shows averages for completers among
2002-2004 fall entry cohorts.
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Table 2.5: HCA Financial Aid
Low-credit Late High-credit
Variables Medium Dropout Dropouts Trials Medium Dropouts Completers
Has Financial Aid
year1, fall 0.348 0.411 0.352 0.463 0.364
year2, fall 0.325 0.373 0.257 0.421 0.240
year3, fall 0.258 0.341 0.268 0.298 0.152
year4, fall 0.227 0.300 0.308 0.216 0.089
Amt.Total Aid($)
year1, fall 493.998 655.676 538.799 757.313 545.605
year2, fall 474.435 621.098 382.859 715.348 397.823
year3, fall 315.772 585.071 399.376 485.658 262.550
year4, fall 274.700 514.916 519.884 295.377 163.162
Has Grant
year1, fall 0.336 0.395 0.332 0.440 0.335
year2, fall 0.314 0.355 0.240 0.398 0.225
year3, fall 0.253 0.320 0.245 0.282 0.141
year4, fall 0.221 0.285 0.288 0.194 0.083
Amt.Total Grant($)
year1, fall 455.901 603.839 493.547 690.171 485.291
year2, fall 431.713 553.312 353.188 636.407 343.479
year3, fall 292.476 494.448 352.626 412.740 216.133
year4, fall 240.787 436.969 445.822 253.333 129.750
Has Loan
year1, fall 0.019 0.025 0.022 0.029 0.024
year2, fall 0.020 0.027 0.023 0.028 0.019
year3, fall 0.010 0.032 0.017 0.025 0.015
year4, fall 0.014 0.027 0.021 0.018 0.011
Amt.Total Loan($)
year1, fall 25.657 31.967 28.126 43.725 34.655
year2, fall 31.014 43.230 23.462 48.250 32.580
year3, fall 18.915 58.018 28.349 53.369 30.392
year4, fall 33.283 54.594 45.911 25.575 23.928
Note. Columns 1–4 are restricted to dropouts among 2002-2004 fall entry cohorts. Column 1 presents
averages of financial aid among low-credit medium dropout cluster, column 2 is for late dropout cluster,
column 3 is for trial cluster, and column 4 is for high-credit medium dropout cluster. Column 5 shows
averages for completers among 2002-2004 fall entry cohorts.
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Table 2.6: Distribution of Cluster
Assignment for Completers
Matched Clusters Sample Size %
1 (Low-credit Medium Dropouts) 6438 17.60
2 (Late Dropouts) 8393 22.94
3 (Trials) 9726 26.58
4 (High-credit Medium Dropouts) 12024 32.87
Note. Samples are restricted to completer among 2002-2004
fall entry cohort students that are matched to a cluster (i.e.,
distance to cluster medoid points fall within caliper). This ta-
ble shows distribution of cluster assignment from hierarchical
clustering analysis. First column indicates cluster assignments,
second column is sample size of each cluster, and third column
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Supply, and Academic Outcomes
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I Introduction
In 1965, President Lyndon Johnson signed into law the Higher Education Act of 1965,
which initiated the precursors to today’s Pell Grant and Stafford Loan programs and solidified
the federal government’s role in higher education finance. Since then, the importance of
federal financial aid policy has only increased. In 2014-15, the federal government provided
over $120 billion in student loans, grants, and other forms of financial aid for undergraduates
- more than four times the level of support provided in 1990-91.
The federal Pell Grant program is the largest single source of grant aid, providing $30.3
billion in grants to over 9 million students annually in 2014-15, up to $5,775 each per year.
Students can use the grant at any eligible institution, and receive the same amount regardless
of where they go. Although the eligibility formula is complex, family income is the main
component: those with family income below $30,000 typically receive the maximum award,
while only about 5 percent of those with family incomes above $70,000 receive any award.
If the award exceeds tuition and fees, students can use the extra amount for books, food, or
other living expenses.
Although a large body of research convincingly demonstrates that financial aid programs
can influence student enrollments and completion (Page & Scott-Clayton, 2016; Deming
& Dynarski, 2009; Long, 2008), evidence on the effects of Pell Grants specifically is more
mixed. Two studies of the effect of the introduction of Pell Grants found no evidence that
college enrollments increased any faster for Pell-eligible students relative to ineligible students
(Hansen, 1983; Kane, 1995). More recently, a regression-discontinuity analysis of urban
community college students just above and below the eligibility cutoff for Pell finds no impact
on college choice, course credits or degree completion (Marx & Turner, 2015). On the other
hand, Pell Grants appear to positively influence enrollment rates for adult students (Seftor
& Turner, 2002) and may increase persistence and acceleration in graduation conditional on
enrollment (Bettinger, 2004; Denning, 2016).
109
The ambiguous evidence regarding Pell has led researchers to investigate possible expla-
nations. Several studies have suggested that the complexity of the federal aid application
process and late notice of Pell eligibility may undermine the ability of the program to reach
students who need aid most (Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2006; Bettinger, Long, Oreopoulos,
& Sanbonmatsu, 2012; Dynarski & Wiederspan, 2012; Scott-Clayton, 2013).
While progress has been made over the past few years to simplify the federal aid applica-
tion process and allow students to apply for aid earlier, another potential explanation for the
mixed effects of Pell has received comparatively less attention: state and institutional aid
policies may interact with the federal aid formula in a way that makes it difficult to isolate
the effect of Pell. The interaction of multiple governments’ fiscal decisions in a redistributive
program like Pell is an example of fiscal vertical externalities (Boadway & Tremblay, 2012;
Johnson, 1988): the federal government acts as the ”first mover” by establishing Pell as the
foundation of financial aid packages (Pell Grants are never reduced as a result of other aid
eligibility), but states or institutions as second movers can reduce or retarget their own aid
dollars in response.
For example, research by Lesley Turner (2014) finds that selective nonprofit institutions
capture, via reductions in institutional aid, 67 cents of every Pell dollar received by their
students. Bettinger and Williams (2013) also find a negative correlation between Pell Grants
and state aid, while McPherson and Schapiro (1991) find a positive correlation between Pell
Grants and overall institutional aid.1 Finally, studies have found that students may adjust
their own borrowing decisions in response to grant eligibility, such that receiving an extra
dollar of grant aid often leads to less a dollar of total additional aid received (Marx &
Turner, 2015; Goldrick-Rab, Kelchen, Harris, & Benson, 2016). Interactions with state
and institutional aid programs may also help explain why the estimated effects of Pell are
1 Tuition levels are another channel through which the impact of Pell could be diminished (this is often
referred to as the ”Bennett hypothesis” after former Secretary of Education William Bennett), although
empirical research on this question has found mixed results (Singell & Stone, 2007; Rizzo & Ehrenberg 2004;
Turner 2014).
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not consistent from study to study, because state and institutional aid programs can vary
substantially from context to context.
The availability of large administrative datasets facilitates research designs that were not
feasible in decades past. In this paper, we utilize such a dataset from a single state on a
population of particular interest: community college enrollees. We implement a regression-
discontinuity design that examines the effects of just barely qualifying for a Pell Grant
on the composition of recipients’ overall financial aid package, students’ labor supply, and
subsequent academic outcomes.
We find that even at community colleges, other sources of student aid do shift substan-
tially around the cutoff for Pell, consistent with Turner (2014) and Marx and Turner (2015).
We find distinctive patterns of financial packaging depending on whether or not institutions
participated in federal loan programs. At institutions that participate in the federal student
loan programs, students above the cutoff (who are ineligible for Pell) borrowed 55% more
than those below the cutoff. This pattern replicates the findings in previous research by
Marx and Turner (2015), though it appears even more strongly in our sample. On the other
hand, at institutions that did not offer loans, students just above the Pell cutoff received
state/institutional grants that offset the discontinuity in Pell Grants (that is, at school not
participating in the loan programs, there is no discontinuity in overall grant aid around the
Pell cutoff).
For our analysis of student labor supply and academic outcomes, we limit the sample
to students attending only loan-offering schools, and interpret the estimates as showing
the effects of shifting students’ aid packages from federal loans to Pell grants. 2 We find
that qualifying for the minimum Pell increases the intensity of enrollment, with recipients 4-7
percentage points more likely to enroll full-time from the spring of their first year to the spring
of their second year. We also find evidence that those who are just barely eligible for Pell
2 We distinguish loan-offering school by looking at average loan take-up rates across cohorts. Although
no-loan schools include those with non-zero take up rates, however, the rates were very close to zero. Schools
that offered loans, no-loans, and switchers were clearly distinguishable.
111
earn less in the first two years after entry, suggesting a reduction of labor supply equivalent
to perhaps one or two hours per week. This is consistent with previous findings that grants
decrease the need to work for pay and allow student to shift their time allocation from
work to school (Benson & Goldrick-Rab, 2011; Schudde, 2013). For cumulative outcomes at
the end of three years - on cumulative GPA, cumulative credits earned, degree completion,
and transfer within three years of entry - we cannot detect statistically significant effects,
though the point estimates are positive and of a magnitude consistent with the impacts on
enrollment intensity throughout the first two years.
After presenting our main results, we examine their sensitivity to possible selection bias.
Our analysis uses data on community college entrants, but Pell eligibility may shift who
chooses to enroll in a community college in the first place. Indeed, we find a discontinuity in
the density of observations around the cutoff that suggests students who qualify for Pell are
disproportionately induced not to enroll in community college (perhaps because they attend
either a four-year or for-profit institution instead). While we are reassured that student
characteristics do not appear to shift around the cutoff, we also address the problem using
two methods introduced in the literature: 1) limiting our analysis to a subset of schools
where we do not observe any evidence of differential selection, and 2) performing a bounding
analysis under extreme assumptions about the missing population.
Unfortunately, because our main estimates are modest to begin with, they are not par-
ticularly robust to these rigorous sensitivity checks, leaving open the possibility that some
of the positive effects we find may be due to differential selection into community colleges
around the Pell grant cutoff. Still, because we find no differences in observed characteristics
around the cutoff, we still view our main results as a reasonable ”best guess” regarding the
impact of receiving a small Pell grant. In addition, a valuable side effect of examining the
potential selection problem is that we can provide some insight on how Pell grant eligibility
may influence institutional choice: the selection patterns we find are much more concentrated
in areas with many nearby for-profit institutions.
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Our paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we take a step towards
understanding how the nation’s largest need-based grant interacts with other aid programs.
We find that other aid programs do respond to federal Pell Grant. Not only so, we find clear
distinctive patterns of financial aid packaging between institutions that participate in federal
loans versus those they do not. Second, our paper is one of the few that looks into the inter-
action of Pell eligibility with employment intensity during enrollment. Much interest on Pell
Grant program has focused particularly on the impacts on college enrollment of low-income
students. We show that students who are just below the cutoff (Pell eligible) seem to shift
their time allocation, reducing work while increasing their enrollment intensity. Finally, our
results provide indirect evidence that Pell grants may influence student enrollment decisions,
in contrast to the findings of Marx and Turner (2015).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides background on finan-
cial aid at community colleges and on the Pell Grant eligibility formula. Section 3 describes
our data and sample. In section 4, we describe our regression discontinuity strategy and high-
light key identification assumptions. Section 5 presents our results, and section 6 discusses
implications and open questions.
II Financial Aid at Community Colleges
Among community college students enrolled in 2011-2012, on average, 38% of student
enrolled received Pell and 17% received federal student loans with an average amount of
$1,140 and $781 per enrollee, respectively.3 Students qualify for the same amount of Pell
regardless of where they enroll, and if the Pell Grant exceeds tuition and fees, students can
receive the remainder back as a refund to cover other educational and living expenses.
Pell is by far the largest source of grant aid for community college students, but approx-
imately 12% of students also receive state grant aid and 13% receive institutional grant aid.
3 Authors’ tabulations using NCES Quick Stats with NPSAS:2012 data split by institution type.
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While the average amounts of state and institutional aid (approximately $190 and $120,
respectively) distributed per enrollee are much smaller than for Pell, our analysis below will
suggest that these smaller programs can be particularly important for students around the
margin of Pell eligibility. Moreover, institutions may have some discretion about how to
distribute state grant aid. In the state we examine here, the state’s need-based grant is
given as a lump sum to institutions, which can then use their own formula to provide aid to
students, as long as it is need-based.
To qualify for any federal aid, students must file a Free Application for Federal Student
Aid (FAFSA). This application collects detailed information on students’ income and assets,
as well as similar information from the parents of dependent students. This information is
used in a complex formula that provides an ”Expected Family Contribution” or EFC as its
output. While over a hundred pieces of information are required to precisely calculate the
EFC, for the vast majority of students, the EFC is determined by income, family size, and
number in college (Dynarski, Scott-Clayton, & Wiederspan 2013). Lower income students
will have lower EFCs. The EFC is used to distribute not just federal aid, but frequently
state and institutional aid as well.
Pell eligibility is directly related to EFC: in general, Pell eligibility equals the maximum
Pell in a given year, minus EFC. However, in most years, there is a minimum grant size
such that the Pell does not decline continuously to zero, but may drop from several hundred
dollars to zero at a certain point in the EFC distribution. The precise formula varies from
year to year. In many years prior to 2008, the minimum grant size was $400 (those with
eligibility between $200 and $399 were rounded up, while those with eligibility below $200
received nothing). In years since 2011, the minimum grant has been $200. However, between
2008 and 2010, the minimum grant size was much larger than usual, in part due to additional
American Reinvestment and Recovery Act funding. In 2008-09 the minimum was $690, rising
to $976 in 2009-10, and falling back to $555 in 2010-11. We thus focus on these years for
our regression discontinuity analysis.
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Eligibility for subsidized student loans is calculated as the total cost of attendance (in-
cluding estimated living expenses, for students attending at least half-time), minus the EFC
and other aid already received by the student, subject to annual loan maximums. Students
are eligible for unsubsidized loans regardless of EFC. Between 2008 and 2010, the combined
limit of subsidized and unsubsidized loans for first-year students was around $5,500 annu-
ally for dependent students and $9,500 annually for independent students.4 It is also worth
pointing out that total costs of attendance are high enough even at community colleges such
that students receiving the minimum Pell Grant are very unlikely to have their state financial
aid limited by the cost of attendance (in 2008, for example, average total cost of attendance
for full-time students at community colleges was $9,700).5
Not all students at community college receive a federal loan offer in their financial aid
packages. Colleges sometimes choose to opt out from Stafford loan program in fear of
sanctions by the federal government.6 For students who are eligible for Pell Grant, attending
colleges that include (relative to colleges that do not include) federal loan offer in their
financial aid package had higher likelihood and amount of borrowing as well as attempted
credit hours in the first year (Wiederspan, 2016).
Examining the effect of a modest Pell Grant for students at community colleges has two
advantages. First, the monetary incentive is sharpest for these students: the minimum Pell
Grant, which averaged $750 between 2008 and 2010, represented a more than 25% discount
on tuition and fees during that time period.7 Second, because of open-access admissions,
community college enrollees are arguably more likely to be on the margin of college atten-
dance and persistence (i.e., potentially more likely to change behavior as a result of aid),
and thus represent a key target population for need-based aid.
4 Federal loan limits are resourced from http://www.finaid.org/loans/historicallimits.phtml
5 2008 figure based on NPSAS:2008 data, using ”student budget (attendance adjusted)” variable for
full-time students.
6 If an institution have more than 30 percent cohort default rate for three consecutive years, that school
is prohibited to offer any federal financial aid, including Pell Grant, for three years (Widerspan, 2016).
7 Based on estimated average tuition and fees of $2,713 in 2010-11 (Baum & Ma, 2011).
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III Data and Sample
The administrative data we use includes more than 20 community colleges in a single state.
The data includes four types of information: student demographics, first-year financial aid
eligibility and receipt, transcript data, degree/transfer information, and quarterly earnings.
Student demographics include race, gender, age, family income, and dependency status.
Financial aid information includes the expected family contribution or EFC (the summary
measure of financial need which determines eligibility for Pell and other federal aid), and
amounts of federal, state, and institutional aid actually received (broken out into detailed
types of aid). Transcript data include remedial placement test scores for those who took
such tests, credits attempted and earned, and grades for each term enrolled in any of the
states’ community colleges. Credential completion and transfer to four-year institutions are
measured using data from the National Student Clearinghouse (NSC), which includes data
for students who leave the community college system. Finally, student records are matched
to quarterly earnings records, which we use to measure of student labor supply during the
first two years post-entry.
The data are limited to first-time, fall entrants to the community college system. We
focus on the 2008-2010 entry cohorts because of particularly large discontinuities in the Pell
formula during those years (in earlier and later years, minimum awards were much smaller).
In these years, the data include a total of 89,000 students. We further limit our sample to
the 57% of students who filed a FAFSA (and thus have the financial information we need
for the regression discontinuity analysis) and have EFCs within $2000 of the Pell cutoff in
the relevant year.
Table 3.1 shows the characteristics and financial aid measures of our sample. The first
three columns describe our analysis sample, while the fourth column provides statistics on the
full sample of enrollees (regardless of EFC and including those who did not file a FAFSA)
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during these years, for comparison.8 The majority of students in our sample are White
students, about equally distributed in gender. On average, students in entry cohorts are
slightly above 21 years old. About 60 percent of students in our analysis sample persisted to
the subsequent fall, and about one-third transferred or received a degree within three years
of entry. The final column provides national averages from the Beginning Postsecondary
Students (BPS) 2012/2014 survey, representing first-time students who entered a public two-
year college during academic year 2011-12. On average, compared to the BPS sample, our
main analysis sample (column 3) has fewer Hispanic students, and has lower family income.
In terms of financial aid, students in our sample received less state aid and borrowed less
compared to the BPS sample.
Table 3.1 indicates that students above and below the EFC cutoff for receiving Pell are
actually quite similar along most demographic dimensions other than family income. This
confirms large differences in Pell receipt around the cutoff, but also highlights that students
who are ineligible for Pell are also much more likely to take out student loans, and somewhat
more likely to receive state grant aid. We will examine these patterns in more detail below.
IV Empirical methodology
A Regression discontinuity design
We use a Regression Discontinuity (RD) design to estimate the causal effect of Pell Grant
eligibility for those near the EFC cutoff, using EFC as our forcing variable. The statutory
discontinuity in Pell for a full-time student was $690 in 2008-09, $976 in 2009-10, and $555
in 2010-11 (awards are prorated for less-than-full-time enrollment).9 The formula is reflected
8 For dependent status, family income, family size, and EFC, our data has information only on those who
have filed a FAFSA.
9 In 2008 and 2009, Pell simply rises linearly below the cutoff until it reaches the maximum. In 2010,
the formula takes a particularly weird shape, with eligibility fixed at $555 for students within a range below
the threshold, then rising linearly for a range, then discontinuously jumping again by about $327 at an EFC
approximately $500 below the cutoff. This odd pattern in 2010 can be detected in Figure 3.1.
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in Figure 3.1, which plots students’ estimated Pell eligibility based on their EFC. We use
estimated Pell eligibility here instead of actual Pell amounts received, because amounts
received are endogenous to enrollment intensity. Later graphs that show actual Pell received
will reflect a similar, if slightly muted pattern (since amounts received can only be equal to
or less than estimated eligibility).
The intuition behind the RD is that if we can assume that the relationship between
EFC and an outcome variable is continuous as we approach the cutoff from either direction,
then any discontinuity in the outcome at the cutoff can be attributed to the discontinuity
in treatment. Formally, using Rubin’s (1974) potential outcomes framework, let Y0i, Y1i be
potential outcomes for an individual i without treatment and with treatment, respectively.
Let PellEligiblei ∈ {0, 1} indicate treatment status.
We can then model outcomes as:
Yi = Y0i + (Y1i − Y0i)PellEligiblei
= f(EFCi) + βiPellEligiblei + vi
(3.1)
where, βi is the treatment effect, E[Y0i|EFCi] = f(EFCi), and vi = Y0i−E[Y0i|EFCi]. The
idea behind the RD design is that Pell eligibility is deterministic by EFC (i.e. PellEligible =
g(EFC)).
Causal inference in the RD model relies on two assumptions: (1) a discontinuity in
treatment assignment E[PellEligiblei|EFCi = c] exists at the cutoff (c0) and (2) (EFCi) is
continuous in the neighborhood of the cutoff (c0) (Hahn, Todd, and Vander Klaauw, 2001;
Imbens & Lemieux, 2008).
If all assumptions above hold, then the local average treatment effect is:
β = limc→c0+E[Yi|EFCi = c]− limc→c0−E[Yi|EFCi = c] (3.2)
In words, the RD estimate is the difference of two regression functions at the cutoff (c0).
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We use a ”sharp” RD estimator, since the treatment of interest is Pell eligibility rather than
receipt, and eligibility is completely determined by the forcing variable. Refer to Appendix
Figure 3.1 for the relationship between EFC and actual probability and amount of Pell
receipt. We implement the RD using a local linear regression estimator with a rectangular
kernel (that is, with all observations weighted equally) for observations within ±2000 from
the EFC cutoff (Hahn, Todd, & Klaauw, 2001; Imbens & Lemieux, 2008).10 Specifically, we
estimate:
Yist = α + β1(PellEligiblei) + β2(Disti × Abovei) + β3(Disti ×Belowi)
+Xiδ + φs + τt + εist
(3.3)
where, Distit is distance from the EFC cutoff for Pell eligibility in the relevant year (Distit =
EFCit−c0t) Aboveit/Belowit is a binary outcome indicating whether individual i in year t has
EFC that is above or below the cutoff; Xi is a vector of individual-level covariates including
race dummies, age, income, dependent status, whether the student had dual enrollment
credits from high school, and placement math, reading, and writing scores (with flags for
missing scores); φs is a vector of school fixed effects; and τt is vector of dummies for each
cohort. If the RD assumptions hold, adding covariates (Xi) is not necessary for identification
of causal effects, but will adjust for small sample bias and reduce standard errors.
In addition to testing for sensitivity across different bandwidths, we also use three band-
width selection methods: cross validation (Ludwig & Miller, 2005) and two plug-in rules
- Imbens and Kalyanaraman (hereafter, IK) (2012) and Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik
(hereafter, CCT) (2014) - as a comparison to our baseline specification.11 We estimate op-
10 When using a subset of points to fit a local regression, different weights can be used to the fit data
points (mostly, weight is given as a function of distance to the point estimator). This weight function is
referred to a kernel. In the regression discontinuity literature, there is no consensus in an optimal choice
of kernel because in practice different weight functions should have little impact on the estimator (Fan &
Gijbels, 1996; McCrary & Royer, 2003; DesJardins & McCall, 2008; Lee & Lemieux, 2010). For consistency,
we use a rectangular kernel, giving equal weights to all local points within the bandwidth, throughout the
paper as suggested by Lee and Lemieux (2010).
11 Lee and Lemieux (2010) also introduce rule-of-thumb bandwidth introduced by DesJardins-McCall
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timal bandwidths under each method for all the outcomes separately and examine their
distribution.
B Threats to Validity
A key assumption for an unbiased RD estimator is that individuals should not be able to
systematically manipulate whether they fall above or below the cutoff of the forcing variable.
Because of the opaque nature of the EFC calculation, the fact that both the EFC formula
and the relevant cutoffs change from year to year, and the fact that a high proportion of
financial aid applicants will have to submit tax documents to verify their income, we are
skeptical that students/families can manipulate their EFCs very precisely.
However, another way that the assumption of continuity in f(EFCi) can be violated is
if there is differential sample selection around the cutoff. This is a bigger concern in this
context, because our sample includes only students who ultimately enrolled in the community
college system, and most students learn their aid eligibility prior to initial enrollment. If
Pell eligibility induces some individuals to enroll in college who would not have otherwise,
or if it influences students’ choice of institution, this will cause a discontinuity in f(EFCi)
within our sample frame.
This assumption can be tested by examining the density of observations around the cutoff.
As shown in Figure 3.2, which plots density using $100 EFC bins, we can see that there is
a jump in the number of observations just to the right of the cutoff; that is, students are
more likely to appear in our community colleges sample if they are ineligible for Pell. The
direction of this enrollment jump is counterintuitive to what we would expect if Pell Grant
induced student’s enrollment choices. To confirm this discontinuity, we conduct a McCrary
(2008) test, which rejects the null hypothesis that the density is smooth. Given the direction
of enrollment jump, we hypothesize that the ”missing” students to the left of the cutoff may
be using their Pell grants to attend other schools than community colleges. We explore on
(2008). We also run rule-of-thumb bandwidth and find similar to IK but slightly smaller.
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this hypothesis further in the section following our main results.
Another approach to evaluating selection bias around the cutoff is to test for disconti-
nuities in the baseline covariates around the EFC cutoff. Appendix Table A1 illustrates the
relationship between covariates and EFC where we use a version of equation (3.3) above
with covariates on the left-hand side to test for any significant discontinuities. Reassuringly,
despite the substantial discontinuity in the density, we find no evidence of discontinuities in
any baseline covariates at the cutoff in our preferred 2000 bandwidth, including not just age,
race, and gender, but also family income, dependency status, and placement test scores.12
This conclusion holds even after limiting the sample to loan schools, which have the largest
discontinuity in density.
Our primary strategy to mitigate selection bias is to control for observable characteristics
around the cutoff. In addition, to assess the possible role of selection on unobservable
dimensions, we test the sensitivity of our results by following two procedures introduced in
the literature: 1) analysis of impacts for a subset of institutions for which no discontinuity
in the density of observations is observed (as proposed by Calcagno and Long, 2008), and
an RD bounding analysis (as proposed by Gerard, Rokkanen, and Rothe [hereafter, GRR],
2016). We describe these strategies in more detail after presenting our main results.
Finally, it is worth noting that while this discontinuity is problematic for an analysis of
outcomes among community college enrollees, it also provides indirect evidence that Pell
eligibility does influence initial enrollment decisions, which is an important margin of impact
on its own. This is in contrast to findings in Marx and Turner (2014), who find no evidence
that Pell eligibility affects either the enrollment margin or the choice of two- versus four-year
college for students who applied to CUNY colleges.13
12 For 4000 bandwidth specification, we see dual enrollment, age, and dependent variables as significantly
different.
13 The CUNY system is substantially more expensive, and arguably more stratified by ability, than the
system under consideration in this paper. While purely speculative, this provides possible explanations for
why Pell eligibility may impact college choice in this context but not in the CUNY context.
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V Results
A Effects of Pell Grant eligibility on the composition of overall
financial aid package
The two panels of Figure 3.3 illustrate how different components of students’ aid packages
change around the Pell eligibility cutoff, with observations grouped into $100 EFC bins and
the size of each circle reflecting the number of observations. All panels plot data for students
at loan schools and no-loan schools separately, for reasons that will become clear. The left
panel shows actual Pell Grant amounts received, and indicates an increase of approximately
$500 just to the left of the cutoff, with no difference between loan and no-loan schools.14
However, a clear difference between these two institution types emerges when we look at
the right panel, plotting average total grants by EFC. Across most of the EFC distribution,
the institutions that do not offer student loans give out more in total grants. They also
use state grant aid to compensate students just above the cutoff for Pell, such that at these
institutions, there is no discontinuity in total grant aid around the Pell cutoff. A large
discontinuity in total grant aid exists only for institutions that participate in the student
loan programs.
The left panel of Figure 3.4 shows student loan receipt by EFC. Of course, at no-loan
schools, student loans are zero throughout the distribution.15 At loan-schools, we see a
sizable jump in average loan amounts for students just above the Pell eligibility threshold.
Considering all aid together, the bottom-right panel shows that for neither institution type
is there any discontinuity in total aid received. For no-loan schools, state grant aid smoothes
out the discontinuity in Pell, while for loan-schools, the discontinuity is smoothed out by
14 This amount is less than the statutory discontinuity in Pell eligibility largely because of less-than-full-
time enrollment.
15 We suspect that the few observations off the line are either data errors or possibly students who switched
institutions mid-year.
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loans. (Also note that the higher state grant aid at no-loan schools does not completely
make up for the lack of loans: students at no-loan schools receive substantially less in total
aid than students at loan schools.)
Table 3.2 shows the regression results corresponding to the panels of Figure 3.5, with the
top portion of the table showing results for loan schools and the bottom portion showing
results for no-loan schools. Confirming what is visible in the pictures, there is a large
discontinuity in Pell Grants in both cases, but at no-loan schools, there is no significant
discontinuity in total grant aid, loans, or total aid. For loan schools, there is a significant
discontinuity in total grant aid (coefficient = $560, p < 0.01), but an equal-and-opposite
discontinuity in loan aid (coefficient = −$592, p < 0.01), leading to no discontinuity in total
aid.16 The pattern of loan take-up at these schools replicates that found in previous research
by Marx & Turner (2015), though it appears even more strongly in our sample.
For no-loan schools, which in our sample represent about half of the institutions but
only about one-quarter of students enrolled, we have no first stage: Pell eligibility has no
discontinuous effect on any treatment we expect to matter (unless we think a dollar of Pell
Grants affects students differently than a dollar of state grants).17 Therefore, we limit our
subsequent analyses to students attending only loan-offering schools, where we do observe a
significant discontinuity in overall grant aid. Even at loan institutions, these findings alter
how we think about the treatment. In interpreting the effects that follow, it is important to
recognize that we are estimating the effect of receiving $500 in grants instead of loans.18
16 Note that total aid includes some other small aid programs, so that it may be slightly more than the
sum of grants and loans.
17 In results not shown here, we can confirm that there are no impacts on any outcome when we run our
models for students at no-loan institutions. Moreover, there is no discontinuity in the density of observations
around the cutoff for these schools.
18 Moreover, as noted by Marx and Turner (2015), these averages mask important heterogeneity, because
everyone to the left of the cutoff qualifies for a $500 Pell Grant, but to the right of the cutoff, some students
take out large loans while others take out nothing. Thus, some students who are bumped just below the
cutoff will experience an increase in total aid, while others may actually take up less total aid than if they
had not been Pell-eligible.
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B Effect of Pell Grant eligibility on academic outcomes and labor
supply while enrolled
Table 3.3 shows our estimated impacts on academic outcomes and student labor supply.
We examine re-enrollment and enrollment intensity, cumulative GPA and credits completed,
and earnings during each of the first two years. We also examine GPA, credits attained,
credentials, and transfer at the end of our three-year follow-up period. Note that for all
outcomes, the difference in treatment is based on the first year difference in aid received;
this does not measure the cumulative effect of receiving Pell for more than one year.19
With a few exceptions, our results are mostly in a positive direction, but small and not
statistically significant. Among the notable exceptions are that we do find significant positive
effects on full-time enrollment in the spring of the first year (5 percentage point increase from
a base of 52 percent), full-time enrollment in the fall of the second year (7 percentage point
increase from a base of 37 percent), and full-time enrollment in the spring of the second year
(4 percentage point increase from a base of 33 percent). In contrast, we find a negative effect
on summer term enrollment between Years 1 and 2 (of about 5 percentage points), which is
surprising taking into account that these include years in which summer Pell Grants were
available.20
We also find consistently negative earnings effects during the first two years, though
the reduction is only statistically significant in the first year. The negative earnings effects
translate into about $12-$20 less per week and are of the same order of magnitude as the
increase in grant aid for Pell-eligible students. These reductions are consistent with a story
in which Pell allows students to shift their time allocation, perhaps an hour or two per week,
from work to school. If true, we might expect to see increases not just in credits but in GPA.
19 Though we cannot confirm it in our sample because we only have one year of aid data, Marx and Turner
(2015) find no discontinuities in subsequent years’ Pell Grants for students around the EFC cutoff in a given
year.
20 When we focus on the cohort most likely to have been eligible for summer pell, the negative effect is no
smaller.
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While effects on cumulative GPA were in a positive direction (between 0.06 to 0.08 points),
they were not statistically significant (though very close by the end of our follow-up period).
Effects on cumulative credits earned, degree completion, and transfer, measured three
years after entry, were generally in a positive direction and of a magnitude consistent with
the positive effects observed in the time periods closest to the treatment. However, we
do not have power to detect small effects on these distal outcomes, and it may simply be
unrealistic to expect to see anything other than small effects given the treatment, which
amounts to replacing $500 in loans with $500 in grants. In some respects, it might be
considered surprising to find any effects of such a modest treatment.
C Sensitivity checks
Optimal Bandwidth
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 assess the sensitivity of our RD estimators using bandwidths of 1/2
and two times our baseline bandwidth of ±2000 (pm1000 and ±4000, respectively). The
general pattern and sign of our main results holds across different bandwidths; however,
both magnitude and significance level fluctuates. For the wide bandwidth, coefficients are
generally smaller. We also calculated optimal bandwidths under three different methods -
cross-validation, IK, and CCT - separately for each outcome considered (see Appendix Table
A2 for a summary of these results).21 Across outcomes, the average bandwidth suggested by
cross-validation and IK is around ±4000, while CCT suggests ±1366. Our baseline ±2000
bandwidth lies at the lower end for cross-validation and IK but at the upper end for CCT.
Given these results, we think our baseline bandwidth of ±2000 bandwidth is reasonable.
21 For implementation, we use rdbwselect() function in Stata rdrobust package provided by Calonico et
al. (2014) under 2014 released version. Note that this package is upgraded in 2016. We use the older version
of that directly estimates across three methods.
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Degree of Polynomial
Misspecification of functional form can generate bias in our treatment estimator when
calculating using linear regression (Lee & Lemieux, 2010). Thus, the last column of Tables
3.2 and 3.3 also provide results using a quadratic specification (with our widest bandwidth).
Again, the overall pattern of results is similar to baseline but magnitudes shift and here
we see some negative results (on spring/summer enrollment in Year 1) become significant.
To explore optimal degree of polynomial, we conduct a degree of polynomial test following
Lee and Lemieux (2010) non-parametric approach by adding bin dummies to the polynomial
regression and testing for joint significance of the bin dummies (equivalent to an F-test using
R-square from with and without the bin dummies regression, see Appendix Table A3 for full
results).22 For each outcome, polynomial degree is determined by the degree where adding
a higher order term no longer makes the bin dummies jointly significant. In some cases,
bin dummies remain significant even regardless of the order of polynomial.23 However, for
variables where functional form does matter, a linear specification (polynomial of degree
one) is generally supported.
D Addressing Sample Selection Bias
Limit analysis to subgroup where no discontinuity is present
We first use a subgroup selection method introduced by Calcagno and Long (2008) to
address the problem of discontinuous density in a different RD setting. Calcagno and Long
(2008), examine the impact of a test-score based assignment to remediation, and find discon-
tinuities in the density of observations around the cutoff at some institutions in their sample,
but not others. They conduct a separate McCrary test for each institution and select only
22 Lee and Lemieux (2010) also uses Akaike information criterion (AIC) model selection for selection
of degree of polynomial, however, recommends non-parametric F-test because lack of visibility to compare
across different models (see Lee & Lemieux (2010) (pg. 326)).
23 We run this test including up to polynomial degree 6. There are no major changes by added extra two
degrees. Ask authors for results for all polynomials up to degree 6.
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a subset of institutions with smooth densities for further analysis. When we follow a paral-
lel approach, we find that nine smaller institutions exhibit no discontinuity in enrollments
around the Pell grant cutoff, while three large institutions do. Hereafter, we refer to the
former group of institutions as the continuous group, and the latter as the non-continuous
group.
Table 3.4, which examines how these two groups of institutions differ, is revealing in itself.
Table 3.4 compares characteristics across two subgroups, continuous and non-continuous
institutions. Initially, we look at averages of pre-treatment covariates for all of our 2008-2010
cohorts. Students at non-continuous schools have more students of color (Black, Hispanic,
and Asians) and substantially less white. Non-continuous schools have more students who
took remedial tests and have slightly higher writing and math scores, on average.24 Exploring
counts and distance of local schools, we find striking differences between the two groups. On
average, continuous schools have no community colleges, 0.4 four-year schools, and 1.8 for-
profit institutions within 10 miles. Schools with discontinuous enrollment around the Pell
cutoff also have no community colleges, but more four-year schools and many more for-profit
schools within 10 miles (1.7 and 12.7, respectively). On average, a student at one of these
schools is only about three miles away from either a four-year or a for-profit institution,
while at continuous schools the nearest alternatives in these sectors are about 20 miles away.
(As one might expect, non-continuous schools are located in more urban areas.) The large
difference in nearby for-profit alternatives, in particular, suggests that perhaps the missing
students who are eligible for Pell may have switched their enrollment to attend at for-profit
schools instead of community colleges. This would be consistent with Cellini’s (2010) finding
that increases in Pell awards increased enrollment at for-profit colleges. It is also possible,
however, that students are using the Pell grant to attend four-year colleges as well.
Unfortunately, the large differences in demographics across the two groups of institu-
24 One relatively large school from the continuous group has essentially zero remedial test take-up rate,
which seems to drive the average down for the continuous group.
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tions makes any differences in impacts hard to interpret. While it would be reassuring if
our analyses held up within our subset of continuous-density schools, if they do not, it is
not clear whether this indicates that our results are driven by selection, or simply that Pell
grants have heterogeneous effects for different student populations. Nonetheless, we present
our results for these two subsets of schools separately in Table 3.5. Our estimated effects on
financial aid packages (top four rows) are consistent with our main results in Table 3.2. How-
ever, for academic and labor market outcomes, we see distinctive regression results between
continuous and non-continuous density groups. The general pattern is that few results are
significant within the continuous group and some outcomes even have the opposite sign. The
positive results that we observe in our main results appear concentrated within the three
large institutions with non-continuous density around the Pell cutoff. The fact that results
are concentrated in the group where selection bias is most severe is not reassuring, but for the
reasons explained above, neither is it definitive. The two groups are very demographically
different and it is possible that effect of Pell Grant is larger for younger, non-white students
with higher test scores.
Bounding Analysis
Another way to account for potential selection bias is to bound our estimates as intro-
duced by Gerard et al. (2015). GRR introduces a way to identify partial treatment effects
through estimating upper/lower bounds by making worst/best assumptions about the miss-
ing population.25 For further details about this methodology, see the Appendix. GRR define
”selectors” as those individuals, in this context, whose enrollment decision is influenced by
whether or not they fall above or below the Pell cutoff. In this case, the selectors who fall
below the cutoff, and hence qualify for Pell, are unobserved. Above the cutoff are a mix of
non-selectors and selectors who would have enrolled elsewhere had they qualified for Pell.
25 GRR bounding exercise is an extension to Lee (2009) bounding exercise in the Sharp RD case. GRR
requires two additional assumptions regarding what they call the ”selectors” (those students whose enrollment
decisions shift as a result of their Pell eligibility): that the direction of selection is one-sided and that the
conditional density is left-differentiable.
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The goal of the GRR method is to estimate upper and lower bounds of the effects for only
non-selectors by trimming the mixed side (in this case, above the cutoff which includes both
selectors and non-selectors) of the estimated proportion of selectors.
We first estimate the proportion of selectors (τ) by calculating the jump in enrollment at
the cutoff from height of the density curve using local polynomial smoothing with rectangular
kernel (and degree 1 polynomial). Second, assuming selectors have the best (worst) observed
outcomes, the upper (lower) bound is estimated by the difference in expectation of outcome
between the left and right side of the cutoff, where the side with more observations has been
trimmed of observations below (above) the τ (or,respectively,1− τ) quantile. See appendix
for further details.
We perform two versions of this bounding analysis. First, we trim separately based on
for each individual outcome, as indicated by the GRR method. This produces the widest
bounds, but is overly conservative in practice because different individuals are trimmed from
the sample for each outcome (it is not the case that the best students on one outcome are
the best students on all outcomes). So, as an alternative, we also examine results when we
trim the sample just once, based on cumulative GPA in the first semester of first year, and
then calculate bounds on all outcomes using that same sample.
Table 3.6 reproduces our baseline regression estimates (±2000 bandwidth including co-
variate controls), and then shows the results from these two versions of our bounding analysis.
As expected, the GRR bounds in column 2 (in which the sample is trimmed separately for
each sample) are very wide. In column 3, we tighten our bounds by trimming only once,
based on a single outcome variable, then calculating bounds on different outcome variables
using that same trimmed sample. We choose cumulative GPA in the fall semester of en-
trance to college, under the logic that whatever are the unobservable factors that influence
enrollment decisions (e.g., student motivation) may correlate with academic performance
as observed after enrollment. Our bounding results (column 3) are tighter with more zero-
excluding bounds (indicated in bold brackets). Effects of Pell eligibility on financial aid
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packaging holds with all zero-excluding bounds. The bounds on full-time enrollment still
fail to exclude zero, but is shifted towards more positive impacts. Academic earnings and
summer earnings in both year 1 and year 2 remain negative with bounds that exclude zero.
VI Discussion
In this paper, we examine the effect of being eligible for Pell on financial aid packages,
student outcome, and labor supply among those who are around the Pell Grant eligibility
cutoff. First, we find that even at community colleges which have relatively little institu-
tional aid to distribute, non-Pell aid awards are influenced by differences in Pell eligibility.
Moreover, the pattern of response is distinctive depending on whether an institution offers
federal student loans: for schools that offer loans, students who just miss qualifying for Pell
borrowed more (almost equivalent to Pell eligibility at the cutoff), such that students just
above and below the Pell cutoff received similar amounts of aid in total. For schools that do
not offer loans, students who don’t qualify for Pell receive higher state grants to compensate.
We next examine the effect of receiving a modest Pell grant (instead of loans) for students
attending loan-offering schools. We find that students who just barely qualify for Pell are
more likely to enroll full-time (about 4-7 percentage points more likely, depending upon
the term) and at the same time reduce their labor supply by about $12-20 per week. These
patterns are consistent with a story in which Pell allows students to shift their time allocation,
perhaps an hour or two per week, from work to school.
We also find a discontinuity in enrollments around the Pell cutoff (within loan-offering
schools), which suggests that Pell eligibility may independently affect enrollment decisions
as well. We find that this discontinuity in enrollments is concentrated at three large urban
community colleges, which have a lot of local market competition, particularly from for-profit
institutions.
Unfortunately, this pattern of enrollments may introduce bias into our regression discon-
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tinuity estimates. To examine this, we follow two methods in the literature: re-estimating
impacts only for the subset of schools with continuous density through the cutoff, and a
bounding analysis that makes extreme assumption about the missing population. In both
cases, our results are not entirely robust. While this is not reassuring, neither does it provide
affirmative evidence that our main results are biased. Our best guess regarding the likely
effects of receiving a modest Pell, in comparison to an equivalent amount of additional loans,
is still drawn from our main results in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, which control for a rich set of
observable characteristics at entry. Still, the lack of robustness suggests these results should
be interpreted cautiously and alongside evidence from other studies.
Our research has two implications. First, even at community colleges, which typically
have very little ”institutional” aid to distribute, institutions may have discretion to determine
how Pell interacts with other state and federal aid programs. In our sample, we find a
complex web of interactions, with state grants smoothing over the discontinuity in the Pell
schedule at no-loan schools, and loans smoothing over the discontinuity at loan schools.
Second, although the resulting treatment is relatively small-essentially implying a shift of
$500 from loans to grants-we nonetheless find some evidence that this alters some student
behaviors. Students who are just below the cutoff (receiving Pell) seem to shift their time
allocation, reducing work while increasing their enrollment intensity; we find significant
increases in full-time enrollment and suggestive (but not significant) evidence of increases
in GPAs. Moreover, we find indirect evidence that Pell eligibility may alter students’ initial
enrollment choices: students just barely eligible for Pell are less likely to show up in our
sample of community college enrollees.
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VII Figures
Figure 3.1: Estimated Pell Grant by EFC (2008-10 Cohort)
Note. Samples are restricted to 2008-2010 cohort students who have filed FAFSA, for whom race/ethnicity is
not missing, and who are non-dual enrollees. Estimated Pell amount is computed by EFC assuming full-time
enrollment intensity. Each point is a mean value of the outcome that falls within a bin of size $100 EFC.
Graph shows only points that fall within the ±$4, 000 bandwidth. Gray line is a fitted line of mean points
within a ±$2, 000 bandwidth.
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Figure 3.2: Density Plot for All Schools
Note. Samples are restricted to 2008-2010 cohort students who have filed FAFSA, for whom race/ethnicity
is not missing, and who are non-dual enrollees. Points represent number of students (sum count) that fall
within a bin of size $100 EFC. Points within a ±$4, 000 bandwidth are included in the figure. Gray line is










































































































































































































































Figure 3.5: Density Plot for Loan Schools (Top) and No-Loan Schools (Bottom)
Note. Samples are restricted to 2008-2010 cohort students who have filed FAFSA, for whom race/ethnicity
is not missing, who are non-dual enrollees, and only for students attending loan schools (top) or no-loan
schools (bottom). Points represent number of students (sum count) that fall within a bin of size $100 EFC.
Points within a ±$4, 000 bandwidth are included in the figure. Gray line is a local smoothed polynomial line
with degree 2, using points within the ±$4, 000 bandwidth.
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Figure 3.6: Density Plot for Continuous Schools (Top) and Non-Continuous Schools (Bot-
tom)
Note. Samples are restricted to 2008-2010 cohort students who have filed FAFSA, for whom race/ethnicity
is not missing, who are non-dual enrollees, and who are attending loan schools. Points represent number of
students (sum count) that fall within a bin of size $100 EFC. Points within ±$4, 000 bandwidth are included

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.4: RD Estimates of Effect of Pell Eligibility on Academic Outcomes and Student Labor Supply
(Loan Schools)
Continous Schools Non-Continous Schools
Outcome Mean Mean
Female (%) 0.528 0.511
Black (%) 0.223 0.285
Hispanic (%) 0.031 0.120
Asian (%) 0.024 0.107
White(%) 0.717 0.481
American Indian (%) 0.006 0.006
Age 21.616 21.601
Dual Enrollment 0.278 0.055
Income $38,752 $44,754
Depend 0.688 0.692
Has Remedial Reading (%) 0.536 0.680
Has Remedial Writing (%) 0.545 0.688
Has Remedial Math (%) 0.387 0.614
Remedial Reading placement score 81.553 81.653
Remedial Writing placement score 69.049 71.703
Remedial Math placement score 34.190 36.007
Prior Credits Attempted 3.864 1.249
Prior Credits Earned 3.507 1.040
Prior Year Earnings (Q3-Q4-Q1-Q2) $2,921 $2,597
Sample Size 24,321 43,221
Local Market
Avg. Number of nearby 2-year public schools (N) 0.0 0.0
Avg. Distance to nearest 2-year school (miles) 27.7 25.3
Avg. Number of nearby 4-year schools (N) 0.4 1.7
Avg. Distance to the nearest 4-year school (miles) 20.4 3.0
Avg. Number of nearby for-profit schools (N) 1.8 12.7
Avg. Distance to nearest for-profit school (miles) 18.2 2.5
Note. Source is College Scorecard Data (n.d.). Top panel: We take all samples from 2008-2010 cohorts and aver-
age the characteristics by whether student’s school is in the non-continuous or continuous group. Bottom panel:
We define nearby schools as those located within less than 10 miles from our sample schools. Distance is calculated











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.6: GRR Bounds on RD Estimates (2008-2010 Cohort, Loan Schools Only)
(1) (2) (3)
Trim by each outcome Trim by cum. GPAOriginal Esti-
mates
Outcome Coef (S.E.) [low, upper] [low, upper]
Amount of Pell received $459 (17) - - - -
Amount of Pell+State grants received $560 (64) [$236, $1,143] * [$377, $661]
Amount of loans received -$592 (113) [$-1,909, $847] [$-692, $-442]
Amount of total aid received $89 (129) [$-1,176, $1,599] [$73, $98]
Year 1 Outcomes
Enrolled full-time, Year 1 Fall 0.020 (0.024) [-0.213, 0.374] [-0.017, 0.021]
Re-enrolled, Year 1 Spring -0.016 (0.020) [-0.156, 0.432] [-0.099, 0.029]
Enrolled full-time, Year 1 Spring 0.048 (0.026) [-0.248, 0.339] [-0.061, 0.085]
Enrolled, Year 1 Summer -0.046 (0.023) [-0.546, 0.041] [-0.125, -0.011]
Cum. GPA, End of Year 0.061 (0.056) [-0.569, 0.577] [-0.516, 0.511]
Cum. Credits Completed, End of Year 0.480 (0.559) [-5.236, 6.610] [-3.885, 3.048]
Cum. Year 1 Earnings (Q4-Q3) -$312 (192) [$-2,749, $3,630] [$-347, $-121]
Year 2 Outcomes
Re-enrolled, Year 2 Fall 0.003 (0.026) [-0.323, 0.264] [-0.074, 0.062]
Enrolled full-time, Year 2 Fall 0.074 (0.026) [-0.343, 0.244] [-0.017, 0.121]
Re-enrolled, Year 2 Spring 0.005 (0.026) [-0.394, 0.193] [-0.091, 0.067]
Enrolled full-time, Year 2 Spring 0.044 (0.025) [-0.424, 0.163] [-0.027, 0.090]
Enrolled, Year 2 Summer -0.004 (0.022) [-0.491, 0.096] [-0.044, 0.023]
Cum. GPA, End of Year 0.074 (0.053) [-0.509, 0.605] [-0.447, 0.453]
Cum. Credits Completed, End of Year 1.243 (1.063) [-9.128, 13.378] [-6.046, 5.703]
Cum. Year 2 Earnings (Q4-Q3) -$281 (224) [$-2,865, $4,477] [$-381, $-54]
End of Year 3 Attainment Outcomes
Cum. GPA 0.084 (0.052) [-0.475, 0.606] [-0.421, 0.451]
Cum. credits earned 1.741 (1.342) [-11.665, 17.283] [-6.900, 6.815]
Ever transferred to 4-Yr 0.026 (0.021) [-0.393, 0.194] [-0.048, 0.094]
Earned any degree/cert 0.010 (0.021) [-0.516, 0.072] [-0.090, 0.068]
Earned any degree/cert or transferred 0.026 (0.024) [-0.406, 0.181] [-0.091, 0.108]
Sample Size 5,753 5,753 4,576 4,576 4,431 4,448
Note. Samples are restricted to students in 2008-2010 fall entry cohorts who filed FAFSA, for whom race/ethnicity is not
missing, and who are attending loan schools. Column 1 is from Table 2 and Table 3. Columns 2 and 3 are bound estimates
using GRR bounding exercise. Square brackets indicate lower and upper bounds of treatment effect after adjusting for sam-
ple selection bias. Column 2 trims and run a single regression separately for each outcome variable. Column 3 trims using a
single variable, cumulative GPA fall semester of 1st year, and runs multiple regressions on different outcomes. All regressions
are specified using local linear regression within ±$2, 000 bandwidth with rectangular kernel, controls for cohort fixed effects,
controls for covariates—female, Black, Hispanic, Asian, American-Indian, age, income, dependent, dual enrollment, reading,
writing, math score prior to entry, and flags on whether they have these test scores—and controls for college fixed effects.
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on Education Outcomes and Employment after the
Second Chance Act of 2007
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Figure A1.1: Un-Adjusted Outcome Trend: Probability of high school graduation
This figure shows un-adjusted trend for high school graduation. Year 2008 is excluded from the regression as a
reference year. The red line indicates first year of law changes in treatment. Years prior to the red line indicate
pre-treatment periods.
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Figure A1.2: Un-Adjusted Outcome Trend: Probability of ever attending college
This figure shows un-adjusted trend for ever attending college. Year 2008 is excluded from the regression as a
reference year. The red line indicates first year of law changes in treatment. Years prior to the red line indicate
pre-treatment periods.
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Figure A1.3: Un-Adjusted Outcome Trend: Employment
This figure shows un-adjusted trend for employment. Year 2008 is excluded from the regression as a reference year.
The red line indicates first year of law changes in treatment. Years prior to the red line indicate pre-treatment
periods.
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II Understanding Dropouts Among Community Col-




I have used R (Version 3.5.3; R Core Team, 2018) and the R-packages bestglm (Version 0.37;
McLeod & Xu, 2018), Biobase (Version 2.42.0; W. Huber et al., 2015), BiocGenerics (Version
0.28.0; Huber et al., 2015), boot (Version 1.3.20; Davison & Hinkley, 1997), caret (Version
6.0.81; Jed Wing et al., 2018), circlize (Version 0.4.5; Z. Gu, Gu, Eils, Schlesner, & Brors,
2014), cluster (Version 2.0.7.1; Maechler, Rousseeuw, Struyf, Hubert, & Hornik, 2018),
ComplexHeatmap (Version 1.99.5; Z. Gu, Eils, & Schlesner, 2016), dendextend (Version 1.9.0;
Galili, 2015), devtools (Version 2.0.1; Wickham, Hester, & Chang, 2018), dplyr (Version
0.7.8; Wickham, Francois, Henry, & Muller, 2018), factoextra (Version 1.0.5; Kassambara &
Mundt, 2017), fastcluster (Version 1.1.25; Mu¨llner, 2013), forcats (Version 0.3.0; Wickham,
2018a), foreach (Version 1.4.4; Microsoft & Weston, 2017), fpc (Version 2.1.11.1; Hennig,
2018), ggplot2 (Version 3.1.0; Wickham, 2016), glmnet (Version 2.0.16; Friedman, Hastie,
& Tibshirani, 2010; Simon, Friedman, Hastie, & Tibshirani, 2011), gmodels (Version 2.18.1;
Warnes et al., 2018), gridExtra (Version 2.3; Auguie, 2017), hopach (Version 2.42.0; van
der Laan & Pollard, 2003), huxtable (Version 4.3.0; Hugh-Jones, 2018), kableExtra (Version
1.0.0; Zhu, 2019), klaR (Version 0.6.14; Weihs, Ligges, Luebke, & Raabe, 2005), lattice
(Version 0.20.38; Sarkar, 2008), leaps (Version 3.0; Fortran code by Alan Miller, 2017),
lmtest (Version 0.9.36; Zeileis & Hothorn, 2002), MASS (Version 7.3.51.1; Venables & Ripley,
2002), Matrix (Version 1.2.16; Bates & Maechler, 2018), mvtnorm (Version 1.0.8; Genz &
Bretz, 2009), NbClust (Version 3.0; Charrad, Ghazzali, Boiteau, & Niknafs, 2014), papaja
(Version 0.1.0.9842; Aust & Barth, 2018), pheatmap (Version 1.0.12; Kolde, 2019), purrr
(Version 0.2.5; Henry & Wickham, 2018), pvclust (Version 2.0.0; Suzuki & Shimodaira,
2015), randomForest (Version 4.6.14; Liaw & Wiener, 2002), readr (Version 1.3.1; Wickham,
Hester, & Francois, 2018), rpart (Version 4.1.13; Therneau & Atkinson, 2018), stargazer
(Version 5.2.2; Hlavac, 2018), stringr (Version 1.4.0; Wickham, 2018b), tibble (Version 2.0.1;
Mu¨ller & Wickham, 2019), tidyr (Version 0.8.2; Wickham & Henry, 2018), tidyverse (Version
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1.2.1; Wickham, 2017), usethis (Version 1.4.0; Wickham & Bryan, 2018), and zoo (Version
1.8.4; Zeileis & Grothendieck, 2005) for all my analyses.
B Comparing with CLARA
CLARA algorithm is an extension of K-medoids clustering algorithm allowing efficient way
to deal with large number of objects. The k-medoids clustering algorithm (a.k.a PAM), uses
classical partitioning technique to cluster objects. In particular, for a given number of cluster
k, the algorithm iteratively (1) assigns cluster centers (i.e., medoids) to existing observation
that minimizes the total distance to other points within the same cluster and (2)re-assign
observations to a cluster that has the minimum distance to the cluster center(Kaufman &
Rousseeuw, 1990). This iteration stops when there is no further change in assignments.
K-medoids is robust to outliers and variable types (do not require numerical variable).26
CLARA extends K-medoids algorithm by first, choosing a random sample from the dataset,
then applying k-medoids algorithm to find optimal set of medoids, and then assigning cluster
to all observations in the sample to its nearest medoids. The process of random sampling,
finding cluster medoids, and assigning observations to clusters is repeated for a selected
number of times to alleviate sampling bias (Kaufman & Rousseeuw, 1990). For each full-
iteration, goodness of clustering is caculated using an average of observation dissimilarity
of each cluster. After all iteration, the final choice of clustering assignment is made by the
smallest average dissimilarity.
A several set of parameters should be pre-defined in order to run CLARA algorithm.
First, the number of cluster (k) needs to be identified, a priori. In order to determine
the number of clusters, I use two methods; elbow method and average silhouette method,
as suggested in the literature (Kassambara, 2017). Second, the user needs to choose a
26One most widely used cluster algorithm is k-means clustering. K-means clustering algorithm differs from
that it requires all variables to be numeric and for cluster centers, assigns centroids, mean of the euclidean
distances between observations within cluster, rather than actual observations as in K-medoids. K-medoids
is more robust to noise and outliers than K-means but, may be more time intensive for large samples (Hastie,
et al., 2009). CLARA improves computing time through sampling.
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distance matrix that will calculate dissimilarities between objects. Under the {cluster} R
package, euclidean, manhattan, and jaccard distances are available, where I choose the




wk (˙xik − xjk)2 (4)








The drawbacks of partitioning algorithm still holds for CLARA. The number of cluster is
unknown to a researcher, a priori. Although I use a heuristic search to identify the number
of clusters and measure goodness of fit, there is no concrete way to measure how well it
aligns with natural(population) number of clusters. Another drawback is, if a data point is
positioned at decision boundaries, that point can be randomly assigned to any cluster in the
decision boundary, which may create space for potential mis-classification errors.
Number of Clusters
As mentioned earlier, unlike HCA, Clara requires the user to specify the number of clusters,
a priori. In order to identify the number of clusters (k), I use two common methods in the
literature to determine optimal number of clusters; elbow method and average silhouette
method (Kassambara, 2017). The elbow method allows the user to choose a reasonable
number of cluster where, the total within-cluster sum of square(wss) do not improve much.
Figure A2.1 plots results from the elbow method, where y-axis is the wss and x-axis is the
number of clusters (k). As the name suggests, the optimal number of cluster is at bend
of the plot. As shown in top panel of Figure A2.1 (a), the optimal number of cluster is
3. The silhouette coefficient contrasts the average distance of observations within cluster to
the average distance of observations in other clusters. A high silhouette width means that
objects aligns well with its cluster and a low value means that there may be decent number of
outliers. The optimal number of cluster is determined when the average silhouette width is
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Table A2.1: CLARA Clustering Distribution
CLARA Clustering %
clara.cluster proportions
1 (Early Dropouts) 0.434
2 (Late Dropouts) 0.162
3 (Trials) 0.404
Note. Samples are restricted to dropouts among
2002-2004 fall entry cohort students. This ta-
ble shows distribution of cluster assignment from
CLARA. First column indicates cluster assign-
ments and second column indicates sample pro-
portions of each clusters.
maximized (Kaufman & Rousseeuw, 1990). The bottom panel of Figure A2.1 (b) shows that
average silhouette width is equally optimized for either two or three clusters. Combining the
two results from elbow method and average silhouette method, I perform Clara with three
number of clusters.
Clara Results
Table A2.1 presents distribution of the three clara clusters. Cluster 1 consist more than
40%, Cluster 2 consists about 16%, and Cluster 3 consists about 40% of the dropout sample.
One way to examine goodness of fit is to see silhouette plot. Figure A2.2 present goodness
of Clara clustering from silhouette plot. As mentioned above, silhouette width calculates
mean similarity of students within cluster subtracted by mean similarity of students in the
next similar cluster. Cluster 3 has .44 silhouette width, which means that Cluster 3 has a
decent goodness of fit. Close to zero silhouette width for Cluster 1 and Cluster 2 suggests
that observations may be somewhat similar to objects in another cluster, as I explore further
below.
Visualizing clara clusters in high dimension can be difficult.27 For the purpose to compare
27In data mining literature, one way to draw a cluster plot after performing principal component analysis
with first two principal component vectors as x-axis and y-axis (reference). Unfortunately, only 15.7 % of
variability was explained using the first two principal components, which makes it hard to visually detect
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Figure A2.1: Number of Clusters using Elbow Method (top) and Silhouette Width (bottom)
(a) Elbow Method
Samples are restricted to dropouts among 2002-
2004 fall entry cohorts. This figure shows total
within-cluster sum of square (WSS) for a range of
number of clusters. The vertical dash line indicates
optimal number of clusters.
(b) Average Silhouette Method
Samples are restricted to dropouts among 2002-
2004 fall entry cohorts. This figure shows average
silhouette width for a range of number of clusters.
The vertical dash line indicates optimal number of
clusters.
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Figure A2.2: Clara Goodness of Fit: Silhouette Plot
Samples are restricted to dropouts among 2002-2004 fall entry cohorts. This figure shows silhouette
plot of the three clusters identified by CLARA. Silhouette width range between -1 to 1 and values
close to zero indicate good fit of data to cluster assignments.
with HCA, I use heatmap to represent my data and compare clara cluster assignment with
HCA cluster assignment. Figure A2.3 top panel shows clara cluster assignment from the
original HCA heatmap. By specifying, a priori, three numbers of clusters, CLARA grouped
the last high-credit and low-credit early dropout groups into a single cluster. Figure A2.3
bottom panel re-arrange students by clara cluster assignments. Similar to HCA, the grouping
seems to reflect timing of when students decide to dropout. The top group resembles late
dropouts who leave school beyond third to fourth year. The middle group resembles early
dropouts who leaves school beyond their first year. Lastly, the third group resembles trial
group, who drops out right after their first semester. Note that the distinction of Clara
clusters is somewhat less distinctive than HCA. Combining the two results from HCA and
Clara clustering, two components distinguish the dropout groups: timing of when student
dropouts (either after first semester, beyond first year, or beyond second to third year) and
credit-side academic performances (high or low credits attempted and college-level credits
earned). Interestingly, none of the two clusters weight much on GPA when distinguishing
the three clusters. Request to the author to see the plots.
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the groups.
To summarize, both HCA and CLARA cluster commonly shows distinctive three groups
of dropouts. A trial group, who tries out college for first semester and decides early to
leave college. This population tends to be older, non-white population, and are getting less
financial aid. The early dropouts, as a whole, does not have distinctive characteristics except
that they stay longer in school than trials group (leaves school after first year) and that they
are a group with relatively high financial aid. HCA does a better job in explaining this
group by dividing into two sub-groups: low-credits and high-credit early dropouts. The low-
credit early dropouts resembles what we would traditionally characterize as a community
college population; older, racially diverse, and are at work when first entering to school. The
high-credit early dropout is an interesting group as their characteristics resemble closely
to completers except that these students take more classes in their first year. Lastly, late
dropout group aligns well with remedial population. These students slowly progress up the
credit hours and elongate their time at school.
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Figure A2.3: Comparison between HCA cluster (top) and CLARA cluster (bottom)
(a) rows sorted by HCA clustering
(b) rows sorted by CLARA Clustering
This figure compares HCA clustering assignments (4 clusters) to CLARA clustering assignments (3
clusters) using heatmap visual representation. Sample is restricted to dropouts among 2002-2004
fall entry cohorts. Each student represent rows. Each columns are listed in the order from left to
right from year one to five: college-level credits earn (fall semester), total credits attempted (fall
semester), term GPA (fall semester), college-level credits earn (spring semester), total credits at-
tempted (spring semester), term GPA (spring semester),and number of attended semesters (out of
total three semesters). Column values are standardized and represented in four quartiles, where red
to blue represent lowest to highest quartiles. The ordering is represented by row clusters only by HCA
cluster (top) and by CLARA cluster (bottom)
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Appendix Tables and Figures
Table A2.2: Logistic Regression with Elastic Net Regularization: Grid Search Results
AUC
alpha Low-credit Medium Late Dropouts Trials High-credit Medium
0.10 0.746703 0.844118 0.676706 0.813589
0.20 0.746772 0.844195 0.676632 0.814258
0.30 0.746801 0.844787 0.676642 0.814341
0.40 0.746844 0.84498 0.676578 0.814441
0.50 0.746819 0.845212 0.676595 0.81457
0.60 0.746811 0.845489 0.676594 0.814472
0.70 0.746852 0.845885 0.676609 0.814637
0.80 0.746783 0.84592 0.676674 0.814705
0.90 0.746819 0.846153 0.67671 0.814825
Note. Samples are restricted to dropouts and matched students who complete. The coefficients show AUC val-
ues for a Cartesian grid search on varying hyper parameter α, which range between 0.1 and 0.9, by an interval




















































































































































Figure A2.5: Matched Completers using Euclidean Distance
This figure is a heatmap representation of matched sample of completing students assigned to a
cluster number with similar enrollment patterns, where the match used euclidean distance. Sample
is restricted to completers among 2002-2004 fall entry cohorts. Each student represent rows. Each
columns are listed in the order from left to right from year one to five: college-level credits earn (fall
semester), total credits attempted (fall semester), term GPA (fall semester), college-level credits earn
(spring semester), total credits attempted (spring semester), term GPA (spring semester),and number
of attended semesters (out of total three semesters). Column values are standardized and represented
in four quartiles, where red to blue represent lowest to highest quartiles. The ordering is represented
by row clusters only.
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III The Impact of Pell Grant Eligibility on Community
College Students’ Financial Aid Packages, Labor
Supply, and Academic Outcomes
Appendix Tables and Figures are available online:
Park, R. SE., & Scott-Clayton, J. (2018). The Impact of Pell Grant Eligibility on Com-
munity College Students’ Financial Aid Packages, Labor Supply, and Academic Outcomes.
Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 40(4), 557–585. https://doi.org/10.3102/
0162373718783868
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